Asia Democracy Research Network

Mapping **East Asian Initiatives** on **AI Governance** for **Democracy**

Juno Kim, Takahiro Nakajima, Rui Aoyama, and Maiko Ichihara

Institute for Global Governance Research, Hitotsubashi University





Asia Democracy Research Network

In 2026, the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) initiated a research project on "AI and Democratic Governance," with a mapping study of East Asian initiatives conducted by the Japanese member research team of ADRN serving as a comparative analytical framework.

Reaffirming the significance of democratic values in the governance of artificial intelligence, the ADRN published this report with the aim of comprehensively mapping the initiatives undertaken by governments and private actors in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—three advanced democracies in East Asia—and assessing the extent to which these initiatives have supported liberal democracy in the face of AI-driven threats.

The report investigates contemporary questions such as:

- What domestic and international initiatives are being undertaken in East Asia to protect democracy from the cross-border impact of AI, and how effectively do they safeguard democratic values?
- How do Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan differ in their approaches to AI governance across key domains including digital democracy, information integrity, cybersecurity, sovereign AI, media, education, and labor?
- What gaps remain in existing AI governance initiatives in East Asia, and what further steps are needed to protect and strengthen liberal democracy?

Drawing on a rich array of resources and analyses, the report provides country-specific insights across ten thematic domains, highlights the limitations of current frameworks in addressing the full scope of AI's impact on democratic institutions, and suggests policy directions to close the gaps between the reach of AI's influence and the scope of existing governance efforts in East Asia.

“Mapping East Asian Initiatives on AI Governance for Democracy”
ISBN (electronic) 979-11-7584-107-9 95340

Table of Contents

Acknowledgement

Abstract & Introduction

Part 1
Overview

Part 2
Digital Democracy

Part 3
Information Integrity

Part 4
Cyber Security

Part 5
Sovereign AI & Privacy

Part 6
Copyright & Intellectual Property Rights

Part 7
Media

Part 8
Education

Part 9
Labor

Part 10

Assistance for Developing Countries

Part 11

Gaps Existing Initiatives and Way Forward

Acknowledgement

We are deeply grateful to all the interviewees who generously shared their time, expertise, and insights with us for this research.

We would especially like to thank Mr. Chihhao Yu of IORG and g0v for sharing his insights into Taiwan's information environment, the role of civic tech communities such as g0v, and IORG's independent research on FIMI.

We are also deeply grateful to Ms. Huian Ho, Head of International Affairs at the Taiwan FactCheck Center, for sharing her insights into TFC's international projects, regional cooperation among fact-checking organizations, and the challenges of sustaining such collaboration.

We would like to appreciate Ohyeon Kweon, Chairman of the social cooperative Parti, for sharing his profound insights both on civic and public initiatives engaging in promoting democratic values in relation to AI in the Republic of Korea.

We would also like to express our sincere gratitude to Ms. Summer Chen, founder of FactLink, for sharing her insights into FactLink's work on prebunking, disinformation playbooks, and capacity-building for journalists and educators.

We are also grateful to Mr. Tim Niven, Deputy CEO of Doublethink Lab, for sharing his insights into Taiwan's information space, particularly the evolving tactics and narratives of PRC-linked information manipulation.

Abstract & Introduction

1. Abstract

Human society is suffering significant consequences at the hands of the very AI we created. AI-driven election interference, cyberattacks, cognitive manipulation, and censorship are severely undermining the outcomes of democratic elections. AI is increasing hate speech and expanding the politics of emotion. It infringes on copyrights, undermines the media's performance as gatekeepers of information, and weakens their role. It takes away jobs, widens economic disparities, and accelerates populism. Due to AI, democracy is showing rapid signs of erosion worldwide.

What initiatives are being undertaken to protect democracy from the cross-border impact of AI use and to strengthen democracy through AI? What limitations do these initiatives face? This report aims to analyze these issues by focusing on the Asian region—a mix of developed and developing countries, as well as democratic and authoritarian states, where regulations and initiatives regarding AI use vary greatly from country to country. Specifically, by mapping the projects undertaken by governments and private actors in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—advanced democracies in East Asia—and assessing the extent to which they have supported liberal democracy, we analyze the remaining challenges in this area.

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have all adopted both soft and hard law frameworks for AI governance but differ in strategic focus and implementation. Japan has introduced new frameworks and revised existing institutional arrangements in a relatively rapid manner. South Korea, driven by its AI G3 vision to catch up with the U.S. and China, prioritizes industry-friendly deregulation through regulatory sandboxes. Taiwan presents its distinctive approach under pressure from the People's Republic of China (PRC), while embedding AI governance within democratic values.

Digital democracy initiatives have developed along distinct trajectories, reflecting different understandings of how digital technologies should support democratic governance. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all face growing pressure on the integrity of the information space, especially from AI-enabled disinformation and foreign influence operations, but they differ in the nature of the threat, the form of response, and the main sources of vulnerability. The three countries all place growing emphasis on cybersecurity, but they differ in their principal threat perceptions, responses, and remaining weaknesses. The governance of personal data and the pursuit of sovereign AI raise critical questions for them regarding how to strengthen technological and economic capacity while safeguarding citizens' rights and preventing the misuse or external exploitation of data. Approaches to generative AI and copyright differ primarily in the degree of legal certainty surrounding AI training data. AI is increasingly affecting the role of the media as a watchdog of power, particularly through its implications for copyright protection and the public's right to know. However, adequate measures to ensure the sustainability of news organizations remain limited. AI education has emerged as a key policy domain, but approaches differ across countries. As the evolution of AI can produce and amplify global inequality, foreign assistance to developing countries has become crucial. In this regard, East Asian democracies exhibit different levels and approaches.

These three countries are in a position where they are striving to catch up with AI-leading countries like the United States and China, and they are implementing policies that also prioritize the promotion of innovation in the AI field. Most of the content of respective guidelines and codes of conduct is formulated with developers in mind. Furthermore, while such codes state that values such as democracy must not be compromised during use, they do not provide guidance on how to safeguard democratic values in cases where the design of AI systems or the manner of their use could easily undermine democratic values within the societies of user countries.

Furthermore, the values essential to upholding liberal democracy, which were highlighted as norms in the Hiroshima AI Process, have not been consistently endorsed in subsequent international initiatives observed in East Asia.

Due to the absence of an international perspective, the potential for authoritarian governments to use AI for data theft, strengthening surveillance systems, and exploiting seemingly democratic actions, such as anti-corruption measures, for political gain is not fully recognized or included in the scope of countermeasures. And despite the weakening of democracy in other countries, support for civil society is inadequate, despite its essential role in such contexts.

2. Introduction

Humans have been advancing automation. We have done so to free ourselves from labor and threats to life; to enjoy freedom and prosperity; and to operate human society in a more efficient and stable way. Over time we have sought to automate diverse phenomena by creating programs using various forms of information—numbers, characters, sounds, and movements. The arrival of the AI era signals that this effort has finally come into full swing.

Yet now, human society is suffering significant consequences at the hands of the very AI we created. AI-driven election interference, cyberattacks, cognitive manipulation, and censorship are severely undermining the outcomes of democratic elections. AI is increasing hate speech and expanding the politics of emotion. It infringes copyrights, undermines the media's performance as gatekeepers of information, and weakens their role. It takes away jobs, widens economic disparities, and accelerates populism. Due to AI, democracy is showing rapid signs of erosion worldwide.

In today's international society, built on the foundation of a market economy, the development of AI by private companies easily spreads to other countries. Chinese government officials consult ChatGPT, developed by the U.S.-based OpenAI, to orchestrate influence operations aimed at ousting Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. Digital surveillance tools developed by Chinese companies are sold to many governments, including those of Myanmar and Pakistan, leading to the systematic suppression of voices critical of government. There are no borders when it comes to

the use of AI and its impact.

Nevertheless, the international community remains structured around sovereign-state systems, and policies are fundamentally formulated on a country-by-country basis. Efforts to protect the integrity of the information space from AI, to shield the media from the proliferation of AI, and to accelerate democratic political participation through AI are almost exclusively carried out domestically. A disconnect exists between the scope of AI's influence and the scope of AI regulation. In developed countries hosting AI companies, vigorous debates are taking place regarding the extent to which these corporate activities should be regulated or promoted, and legal frameworks are evolving daily. In contrast, developing countries, while affected by AI companies from developed economies, lack the ability to regulate them effectively because these companies are not headquartered domestically.

Furthermore, although initiatives related to AI are being undertaken in various fields, cross-disciplinary efforts are scarce. Discussions and initiatives regarding the use and regulation of AI are taking place in individual sectors—such as the impact of AI on the integrity of the information space, cybersecurity, copyright, and privacy. These sectors each influence democracy through their own channels, and these initiatives all aim to protect democratic societies. However, they face the limitations of a deductive approach. Efforts to understand what is necessary for the overall framework of democratic institutions and values, and to protect them, must go beyond initiatives focused on specific, narrow fields.

Furthermore, the actors using AI to undermine democracy are not all the same. While some authoritarian governments seek to suppress anti-government movements by establishing AI-driven surveillance networks to monitor civil society and crack down on citizens, tech companies use algorithms designed to drive profit to accelerate the politics of emotion, destabilizing democratic societies. We must protect democratic societies from both types of activities.

What domestic initiatives are being undertaken to protect democracy from the cross-border impact of AI use and to strengthen democracy through AI? What limitations do these initiatives face? This report aims to analyze these issues by focusing on the Asian region—a mix of developed and developing countries, as well as democratic and authoritarian states, where regulations and initiatives regarding AI use vary greatly from country to country. Specifically, by mapping the projects undertaken by governments and private actors in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—advanced

democracies in East Asia—and assessing the extent to which they have supported liberal democracy, we analyze the remaining challenges in this area.

Chapter 1 overviews the grand design of AI frameworks and the position of democratic values within them, across these three democracies; and Chapter 2 discusses the current state of digital democracy initiatives. Chapter 3 introduces initiatives aimed at ensuring the integrity of information. Chapter 4 then discusses cybersecurity efforts to protect democratic societies from cyberattacks. Chapter 5 examines the rapidly evolving trend of sovereign AI, along with related privacy issues. Chapter 6 discusses initiatives related to copyright and intellectual property rights, which are essential for ensuring the circulation of accurate information while safeguarding the free market economy. Chapter 7 introduces initiatives regarding the media as a filter for providing accurate information, and Chapter 8 discusses efforts in the education sector aimed at enhancing societal resilience. Chapter 9 discusses measures to protect workers from AI-induced economic disparities that could fuel populism, and Chapter 10 examines AI-related assistance from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to developing countries. Finally, the concluding chapter discusses what is missing from the current AI initiatives in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Note that the initiatives of the respective countries discussed in this report are as of February 2026.



1. Overview

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have all adopted both soft and hard law frameworks for AI governance but differ in strategic focus and implementation. Japan has introduced new frameworks and revised existing institutional arrangements in a relatively rapid manner. Beyond domestic enactment such as the AI Act and the AI Basic Plan—which grounds governance in democratic values including human rights, rule of law, diversity, and human-centricity articulated in the Social Principles of Human-Centric AI—Japan actively shapes international norms through the Hiroshima AI Process as well. South Korea, driven by its AI G3 vision to catch up with the U.S. and China, prioritizes industry-friendly deregulation through regulatory sandboxes. In parallel, Korea's democratic key message has shifted from the Yoon administration's Liberal Democracy to the current Lee administration's AI Basic Society, which emphasizes universal AI literacy and AI-assisted social services. Taiwan presents its distinctive approach under pressure from the PRC, while embedding AI governance within democratic values. Its Artificial Intelligence Basic Act emphasizes human autonomy, privacy, fairness, and accountability, supported by robust civil society infrastructure including g0v alongside independent fact-checking organizations.

1. Japan

1.1. Institutional Response and International Commitment

Japan's approach to AI governance is characterized by relatively rapid institutional responses combined with continuous engagement in international rule-making. Japan enacted the AI Act in early 2025 and adopted the AI Basic Plan in December 2025. Together with earlier policy initiatives, these documents aim to balance risk and innovation while enabling agile responses to technological change, with the strategic goal (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 2026) of making Japan "the most AI-friendly country in the world." Rather than establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework similar to the EU's AI Act, Japan's governance model relies on soft-law instruments. These include the Social Principles of Human-Centric AI (2019), the AI Business Guidelines (2024, revised in 2025), and the Guideline for Ensuring the Appropriateness of Research and Development and Utilization of AI-Related Technologies (2025). Reflecting the societal impact of AI, Japan has also revised, or is seeking to revise, existing legal frameworks in several areas, including, as discussed below, copyright, property rights, and privacy protection.

A government official noted (Asahi Shimbun 2024) that Japan leveraged its distinctive position between the innovation-oriented United States and rights-oriented Europe in shaping discussions within the Hiroshima AI Process.

Domestic discussions on governing AI systems have developed in parallel with international initiatives. The process (Ichikawa 2020) began in 2016 with the aim of formulating AI principles that could contribute to global rule-making. Since then, Japan has actively promoted AI governance discussions in international forums, including the G7, OECD, and G20. In 2023, under Japan's presidency, the G7 launched the Hiroshima AI Process, which resulted in the Hiroshima AI Process Comprehensive Policy Framework, one of the first international governance frameworks addressing advanced AI systems. A government official noted (Asahi Shimbun 2024) that Japan leveraged its distinctive position between the innovation-oriented United States and rights-oriented Europe in shaping discussions within the Hiroshima AI Process.

1.2. Democratic Values, Strategic Motivation, and the Role of Private Actors

Across these documents, democratic values are consistently articulated as key governance principles. These include the rule of law, human rights, democracy, diversity, inclusion, fairness, human-centricity, safety, transparency, accountability, security, privacy and personal data protection, fair competition, and digital literacy. Among governmental policies, the Social Principles of Human-Centric AI, adopted in 2019, established the foundational normative framework, emphasizing that AI development and use should respect human dignity and democratic values.

At the same time, it is important to note that AI policy formulation in Japan is driven not solely by the promotion of democratic values but also, and perhaps more strongly, by strategic imperatives to close the gap with leading global AI industries. As highlighted in the AI Act (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 2025), "Japan is lagging behind in AI development and use," and the government has accordingly identified AI as a priority area within its national Growth Strategy (Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan N.d.a).

Private actors in Japan are also actively engaging with the social implications of AI. Many universities have established ELSI (Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues) centers to study how emerging technologies affect society. Multi-stakeholder initiatives, such as the Hitachi Kyoto University Laboratory and the Kyoto Institute of Philosophy, facilitate interdisciplinary discussion on these challenges. In addition, organizations such as the AI Governance Association and Digital Policy Forum Japan have contributed policy proposals to guide national responses to AI. Together, these activities reflect a broad and multifaceted engagement with the relationship between AI and society in Japan.

At the same time, it is important to note that AI policy formulation in Japan is driven not solely by the promotion of democratic values but also, and perhaps more strongly, by strategic imperatives to close the gap with leading global AI industries.

2. South Korea

2.1. AI Governance Under G3 Vision

Instead of rigid mandates, Korea utilizes the "AI Basic Act"(National Assembly of the Republic of Korea 2026) as a broad legal ground supported by soft law designed to foster a flexible environment.

South Korea's AI governance is founded on the ambitious "AI G3" vision (Ministry of Science and ICT 2025a), a strategic imperative to catch up with the U.S. and China through an innovation-led framework. A central pillar of this approach is the government's responsiveness to industrial demands (Seo 2025) for deregulation. The private sector frequently argues that compared to global leaders, Korea's restricted environment hinders competitiveness, leading the state to prioritize industry-friendly policies. Instead of rigid mandates, Korea utilizes the "AI Basic Act"(National Assembly of the Republic of Korea 2026) as a broad legal ground supported by soft law designed to foster a flexible environment. By emphasizing regulatory sandboxes, which function as controlled environments where companies can test AI technologies with relaxed regulatory requirements, the state aims to maximize industrial experimentation while selectively applying oversight to "High-Impact AI," effectively positioning technological capability as the cornerstone of national security and economic growth. The law's regulatory scope also has extended to foreign AI systems affecting users or markets within South Korea. The Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) is empowered to investigate violations and may issue corrective orders or impose administrative fines of up to KRW 30 million (approximately USD 22,000).

2.2. Alteration in Democratic Values

The current Lee administration's "AI Basic Society" is grounded in its broader policy framework of a "Basic Society," which emphasizes citizens' egalitarian access to social services based on principles of redistributive justice. While the previous leadership left a number of statements asserting the protection of liberal democracy under the AI-era as a primary objective, its institutionalization and practical application often remained vague. In contrast, the current administration has adopted a more proactive stance, championing the "AI Basic Society" model where AI literacy and access to AI-assisted social services are framed as universal rights.

Beyond domestic policy, Korea is actively asserting its influence in shaping international AI norms through major initiatives such as the AI Seoul Summit[1] (AI Seoul Summit n.d.), following the inaugural AI Safety Summit in the United Kingdom, and a leadership role in the Gyeongju APEC (Korea Policy Briefing 2025).

2.3. Efforts of Civil Society and Academia

Civil society participation and academic discussion often lack tangible veto power over industrial strategies, leaving the final direction of AI development largely in the hands of the state and major tech firms.

While the state drives the technological powerhouse narrative, a robust network of academia and civil society acts as both an enabler and a watchdog for democratic AI development. Groups like Jinbonet and People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy monitor the side-effects of emerging AI threats and speak on behalf of those challenged by the asymmetric strength of big-tech incorporations. Furthermore, social organizations like Parti have endeavored to redefine deliberative democracy by using AI to function as an instrument for citizens to deliver mass opinions into coherent policy agendas. Simultaneously, university-based centers such as Seoul National University AI Institute's Center for Industry Collaboration have provided the theoretical rigor for trustworthy AI, ensuring democratic values are not sidelined in policy drafts. Despite these efforts, a recurring challenge remains. Civil society participation and academic discussion often lack tangible veto power over industrial strategies, leaving the final direction of AI development largely in the hands of the state and major tech firms.

3. Taiwan

Taiwan is characterized by a combination of high vulnerability and an emerging form of social resilience: it is a democracy exposed to intense information pressure from the PRC, yet one in which efforts to resist such pressure have also taken shape. Despite ongoing concerns over Chinese electoral interference, disinformation, and influence operations, Freedom House 2025 (Freedom House 2025) continues to rate Taiwan highly on both political rights (38/40) and civil liberties (56/60). In this sense, Taiwan can be understood as a society that remains highly exposed to PRC-originated

[1] AI Seoul Summit. "AI Seoul Summit 2024." https://aiseoulsummit.kr/aiss/.

foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) while continuing to sustain democratic institutions. This resilience is supported by a dense infrastructure of civil society and digital participation. The Taiwan Open Government National Action Plan (2021–2024) & (2025–2028) institutionalizes co-governance between the state and civil society and sets out concrete commitments to transparency, accountability, and expanded citizen participation (National Development Council 2021a; 2025). Alongside this framework, Taiwan's civic and digital-democratic ecosystem includes g0v[2], JOIN[3], and vTaiwan[4], while the integrity of the information environment is supported by organizations such as the Taiwan FactCheck Center (TFC)[5], MyGoPen[6], FactLink[7], Doublethink Lab[8], and Taiwan Information Environment Research Center (IORG)[9], which maintain a degree of independence from the government even as they interact with public institutions.

Although it does not itself impose penalties, Taiwan appears to be adopting a regulatory approach that combines a general principles-based law with more specific sectoral policies to address particular risks.

At the institutional level, Taiwan's Artificial Intelligence (AI) Basic Act (Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China 2026) was passed by the Legislative Yuan in December 2025 and came into effect in January 2026. The Act seeks to harmonize technological progress with social welfare and sets out basic principles including human autonomy, privacy and data governance, safety, transparency, fairness and non-discrimination, and accountability. Although it does not itself impose penalties, Taiwan appears to be adopting a regulatory approach that combines a general principles-based law with more specific sectoral policies to address particular risks. Under the current

---

[2] g0v. "g0v: Decentralised Civic Tech Community, Taiwan." https://g0v.tw/intl/en/.

[3] National Development Council (Taiwan). "Join: Public Policy Network Participation Platform." https://join.gov.tw/.

[4] vTaiwan. "vTaiwan: Rethinking Democracy." https://info.vtaiwan.tw/.

[5] Taiwan FactCheck Center. "Home." https://en.tfc-taiwan.org.tw/.

[6] MyGoPen. "MyGoPen: Fact-Checking and Rumor Clarification Platform, Taiwan." https://www.mygopen.com/.

[7] FactLink. "FactLink 數位素養實驗室: Digital Investigation, AI Literacy, Media Literacy." https://www.factlink.tw/.

[8] Doublethink Lab. "Doublethink Lab: Strengthen Democracy Through Enhancing Digital Defenses." https://doublethinklab.org/.

[9] IORG (Taiwan Information Environment Research Center). "About IORG." https://iorg.tw/_ua/about.

law, the National Science and Technology Council[10] is designated as the central competent authority and is responsible for AI research and talent development, while the Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA)[11], established in 2022 to integrate digital policy across telecommunications, information, communication, cyberspace, and the internet, has become the de facto driver of the Basic Act's implementation.

At the same time, Taiwan positions AI not only as an object of regulation but also as a core component of national growth strategy. According to the National Development Council (NDC)[12], the Ten AI Initiatives Promotion Plan (2025-28) was approved by the Executive Yuan in January 2026 and presented as a national strategy to transform Taiwan into a Smart Technology Island (National Development Council 2026). The plan seeks to generate NT$15 trillion (about US$474 billion) in economic value and create 500,000 high-paying jobs by 2040, with sovereign AI, digital and computing infrastructure, advanced technologies, and the establishment of three international-level laboratories forming its central pillars (Taiwan Today 2026). Taiwan can therefore be seen both as a democracy that is highly vulnerable to PRC-originated FIMI and as an advanced case of democratic self-defense in the AI era, supported by civil society and institutional innovation.

At the same time, Taiwan positions AI not only as an object of regulation but also as a core component of national growth strategy.

[10] National Science and Technology Council, Republic of China (Taiwan). "National Science and Technology Council, R.O.C." https://www.nstc.gov.tw/?l=en.

[11] Ministry of Digital Affairs (Taiwan). "Ministry of Digital Affairs." https://moda.gov.tw/en/.

[12] National Development Council (Taiwan). "National Development Council." https://www.ndc.gov.tw/.



Part 2
Digital Democracy

Digital democracy initiatives have developed along distinct trajectories, reflecting different understandings of how digital technologies should support democratic governance. In Japan, efforts have primarily focused on using digital tools, including AI, to visualize citizens' opinions and facilitate consensus-building in policy discussions. Initiatives have emerged across the private sector, local governments, and political actors, but they remain largely experimental and project-based, with limited impact on formal national decision-making processes. In contrast, South Korea has pursued a more systemic and institutionalized trajectory, focusing on upgrading its established participatory platforms with AI-driven facilitators to enhance policy co-design and creating high-level bodies like the AI Democracy Committee. Taiwan represents another trajectory, often highlighted as a model of digital democracy built upon a strong civic-tech ecosystem with institutionalized channels for public participation like vTaiwan. At the same time, each approach faces limitations: Japan's initiatives remain experimental, Korea's regulatory approach raises concerns about potential restrictions on political expression, and Taiwan's participatory platforms have been criticized for engaging only a relatively narrow segment of society.

1. Japan

1.1. Increasing Utilization by Private Actors and Local Governments

Initiatives related to digital democracy in Japan can be observed across the private sector, local governments, and the political sphere. Practical experiments and pilot efforts have increased, but arrangements in national decision-making remain limited. In the private sector, initiatives have emerged that collect citizens' views and provide opportunities for discussion, and some tools are already used in administrative and project settings. Digital Democracy 2030[1] presents a vision of using digital technologies to make citizens' views visible and to inform political and administrative processes. Liquitous[2] has been used to support online discussion and consensus-building in specific projects, including collaboration with local governments.

These practices were intended to inform policy discussions rather than directly determine outcomes.

Local governments, particularly the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, have also advanced related efforts. GovTech Tokyo[3] has promoted administrative digitalization and supported data use and operational capacity across the metropolitan government and municipalities. In addition, Tokyo has applied broad listening methods (Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Office of the Governor for Policy Planning 2025) in the formulation of its long-term policy agenda. In the development of the Tokyo 2050 strategy, tools associated with the Digital Democracy 2030 initiative were used to collect and analyze a wide range of citizens' views. GovTech Tokyo supported this process by building systems to gather digital inputs and by using AI to visualize and organize the collected opinions. These practices were intended to inform policy discussions rather than directly determine outcomes.

1.2. Limited Realization in National Politics

[1] Digital Democracy 2030 Project (デジタル民主主義2030). "Home." https://dd2030.org/ .

[2] Liquitous. "Liquitous: Civic Participation and Consensus-Building Platform." https://liquitous.com/ .

[3] GovTech Tokyo (GovTech東京). "GovTech Tokyo." https://www.govtechtokyo.or.jp/ .

While these developments indicate that the use of AI within bureaucratic organizations has begun to expand, they have not yet reached a stage where they fundamentally reshape democratic decision-making processes.

In the political sphere, digital approaches have begun to be discussed but have not yet become institutionalized. The Tokyo gubernatorial election provided an early example in which digital tools were used to engage with citizens and communicate policy positions. These efforts were associated with initiatives led by Anno Takahiro, AI engineer and Member of the House of Councillors of Japan, and related actors who sought to incorporate digital methods into political engagement. Led by Anno, Team Mirai increased its number of seats in the Diet and has sought to use AI to understand public views and support policy development. Cross-party study groups on AI have been established to share knowledge and discuss policy issues, but these efforts remain at the stage of learning and agenda formation rather than institutional practice.

A range of actors are involved and practical initiatives are increasing. At the same time, these efforts are often organized as individual projects, and their connection to formal decision-making remains limited, particularly at the national level. The AI Basic Plan states that the government will take a leading role in "actively and proactively utilizing AI" to promote broader usage across the general population. In line with this objective, the Digital Agency has launched (Matsumoto 2026) a large-scale demonstration project for the government AI system. While these developments indicate that the use of AI within bureaucratic organizations has begun to expand, they have not yet reached a stage where they fundamentally reshape democratic decision-making processes.

2. South Korea

2.1. Evolution of Civic Engagement and Democracy

South Korea is evolving its developed digital legacy by enhancing established citizen participatory platforms, from e-People [4] to Sotong24 [5], into a more AI-driven participatory governance model (Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission 2026). Rather than replacing these successful foundations, the government is integrating AI as an intelligent facilitator to more efficiently classify, summarize, and respond to the massive inputs of citizen voices, thereby reinforcing the role of citizens as active policy co-designers. Simultaneously, to address concerns over the black-box nature of AI and the potential exclusion of specific social groups, the state is institutionalizing ethical safeguards, exemplified by the "Ethical Guidelines for AI in the Public Sector" (Ministry of the Interior and Safety 2025) at the national level and the "Seoul AI Ethics Guidelines" (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2026) at the regional level. Beyond fostering participation, the government elevates democratic principles to a core priority within the national AI strategy. As a pivotal move, the AI Democracy Subcommittee (Ministry of Science and ICT 2026b) was recently added to the existing subcommittees of the Presidential Council on National Artificial Intelligence Strategy, marking a monumental decision to institutionalize democratic values at the highest level of AI leadership.

South Korea is intensifying legislative efforts to ensure technological benefits are shared within all nations equally.

2.2. Democratic Equality and Inclusive Legislation

South Korea is intensifying legislative efforts to ensure technological benefits are shared within all nations equally. The "Digital Inclusion Act" (National Assembly of the Republic of Korea 2025) and proposed amendments to the "AI Framework Act" (Ministry of Science and ICT 2025d) specifically aim to protect vulnerable populations, codifying their rights to AI accessibility and participating in AI governance. These legal frameworks focus on preventing social exclusion by mandating protections for the marginalized. Complementing these policies, Big Tech

[4] Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (Korea). "e-People: National Civil Petition Service." https://www.epeople.go.kr/index.jsp.

[5] Ministry of the Interior (Korea). "Sotong24: Online Public Communication Platform (소통24)." https://sotong.go.kr/front/main/index.do.

is also deploying AI for universal social welfare. For instance, Naver's "CLOVA CareCall"[6] utilizes generative AI to monitor the health of the elderly, demonstrating how technology can serve as a practical tool for protecting vulnerable citizens.

Ultimately, while Korea's democratic AI framework is theoretically sound, its long-term credibility will depend on whether these institutional designs translate into meaningful civic participation, with no groups excluded.

Korea demonstrates a willingness to embed democratic safeguards directly into its AI governance blueprint, characterized by institutional proactivity ranging from an AI-driven participatory governance model to the establishment of the AI Democracy Subcommittee inside the AI Presidential Council. While the Digital Inclusion Act and corporate initiatives like CLOVA CareCall reflect a genuine legislative and corporate push toward inclusive AI, the gap between codified rights and actual accessibility for vulnerable populations remains a critical variable yet to be fulfilled. Ultimately, while Korea's democratic AI framework is theoretically sound, its long-term credibility will depend on whether these institutional designs translate into meaningful civic participation, with no groups excluded.

3. Taiwan

3.1. The Concept of Taiwan's Digital Democracy: "Plurality"

Taiwan's model of digital democracy is grounded in the idea of plurality[7], advocated by figures such as Audrey Tang (Tang 2025), who became MODA's inaugural minister upon its establishment in 2022. Rather than relying on simple majoritarianism, the plurality approach seeks to avoid the polarization that majority rule can generate. Even if 51 percent support a decision, the dissatisfaction of the remaining 49 percent may endure, fostering backlash and distrust. Taiwan's approach, by contrast, aims not to erase differences but to identify overlap across diverse views and use it to advance

[6] NAVER Cloud. "CLOVA CareCall: AI Welfare Call Service." https://www.ncloud.com/product/aiService/clovaCareCall.

[7] Weyl, E. Glen, Audrey Tang, and the Plurality Community. "Plurality: The Future of Collaborative Technology and Democracy." https://plurality.net/.

democracy. Through open-source tools such as Pol.is[8] and Talk to the City (T3C)[9], participatory platforms such as vTaiwan[10] and JOIN[11], and close coordination with government institutions—particularly the NDC[12]—Taiwan has sought to combine broad public participation with deeper deliberation.

3.2. Open Government and Civil Society

Taiwan's open-government agenda, including open data initiatives, entered a more formal and institutionalized phase with the adoption of a national action plan in 2021. Overseen by the NDC, the Taiwan Open Government National Action Plan (2021–2024) & (2025–2028) institutionalizes co-governance between the state and civil society and sets out concrete commitments to transparency, accountability, and expanded citizen participation (National Development Council 2021a; 2025). In practice, these principles have been operationalized through a broader ecosystem of civic-tech initiatives and participatory infrastructures, including g0v, vTaiwan, JOIN, and, more recently, T3C.

g0v[13] is a decentralized civic-tech community launched in 2012. Based on transparency and open collaboration, g0v has addressed public issues from outside the government. A representative example is Cofacts[14], a collaborative fact-checking system that enables citizens to verify suspicious information circulating on LINE, the messaging app dominant in Taiwan.

vTaiwan[15] is an online-offline public consultation process launched in 2014 to enable citizens, government officials, businesses, and experts to deliberate on national policy issues. Using open-source tools such as Pol.is[16], participants can

---

[8] The Computational Democracy Project. "Polis." https://pol.is/signin.

[9] AI Objectives Institute. "Talk to the City." https://talktothe.city/.

[10] vTaiwan. "vTaiwan: Rethinking Democracy." https://info.vtaiwan.tw/.

[11] National Development Council (Taiwan). "Join: Public Policy Network Participation Platform." https://join.gov.tw/.

[12] National Development Council (Taiwan). "National Development Council." https://www.ndc.gov.tw/.

[13] g0v. "g0v: Decentralised Civic Tech Community, Taiwan." https://g0v.tw/intl/en/.

[14] Cofacts. "Cofacts: Message Reporting Chatbot and Crowd-Sourced Fact-Checking Community." https://en.cofacts.tw/.

[15] vTaiwan. "vTaiwan: Rethinking Democracy." https://info.vtaiwan.tw/.

[16] The Computational Democracy Project. "Polis." https://pol.is/signin.

register agreement, disagreement, or uncertainty, making it possible to visualize large-scale opinion distributions and identify areas of potential consensus. Rather than amplifying conflict, vTaiwan is designed to surface bridge-building arguments and actionable common ground. By 2023, it had handled more than 28 cases, around 80 percent of which reportedly led to concrete government action. Representative cases include deliberations over Uber Regulation (Tang 2016) in 2015 and the FinTech framework introduced in 2018.

JOIN[17] is the NDC's official online participation platform, established in 2015[18] as a permanent channel through which citizens can submit opinions, make policy proposals, and monitor implementation. Under the Directions for Implementing Online Participation in Public Policy (Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2018), the NDC serves as the platform's managing authority. Proposers are defined as persons with Taiwanese nationality or permanent residency in Taiwan, and no explicit age requirement is stipulated (Point 4(1)). If a proposal gathers 5,000 supporting signatures within 60 days, the competent authority must publish a concrete response within two months (Point 7 (2)). According to the NDC (National Development Council 2021b), from the platform's launch in 2015 to 31 January 2021, JOIN received 10,411 proposals in total; 5,248 advanced to the co-signature stage, 233 became formal cases, 220 received official responses, and 105 were adopted by government agencies. In 2024 alone, the National Council for Sustainable Development (National Council for Sustainable Development 2025) reported 2,801 proposals, of which 1,236 advanced to the co-signature stage, 24 became formal cases, and 10 were partially adopted. One illustrative case is the 2018 proposal calling for legal access to artificial insemination and IVF for single women (Wu 2018). After gathering 5,124 supporting signatures within 60 days, it received a formal response from the Ministry of Health and Welfare and was connected to a collaborative consultation process. In 2025, a draft amendment to the Assisted Reproduction Act (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2025), extending access to unmarried women and women in same-sex marriages, passed the Executive Yuan.

T3C[19], released as open source in October 2023, is an AI analysis tool that uses LLMs to process large volumes of open-ended responses and deliberative data.

---

[17] National Development Council (Taiwan). "Join: Public Policy Network Participation Platform." https://join.gov.tw/.

[18] National Development Council (Taiwan). "About Join: Public Policy Network Participation Platform." https://join.gov.tw/aboutus/index/en_US.

[19] AI Objectives Institute. "Talk to the City." https://talktothe.city/.

According to its report[20], its key innovation lies in summarizing large-scale public input while preserving the nuance and diversity of views. In collaboration with MODA, T3C has been used to analyze large response datasets on issues such as the AI Assembly 2023 workshops [21] and post-election political analysis of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan's 2024 presidential election.[22]

3.3. Critical Evaluation

As Chihhao Yu of g0v argues, digital tools should be seen as complementary to, rather than constitutive of, democracy, whose foundation ultimately lies in offline deliberation and civil society.

Overall, Taiwan's civil society appears comparatively strong, and Glen Weyl[23] identifies Taiwan as a leading example of the intersection of technology and democracy. Audrey Tang's international prominence has further elevated the visibility of this model. At the same time, however, JOIN remains limited in reach and tends to attract a relatively small and elite segment of society, while the continued citation of vTaiwan as a flagship case, despite being more than a decade old, suggests that Taiwan's digital democracy is still often understood through one of its earliest and most visible cases. As Chihhao Yu [24] of g0v argues, digital tools should be seen as complementary to, rather than constitutive of, democracy, whose foundation ultimately lies in offline deliberation and civil society.

---

[20] AI Objectives Institute, "Talk to the City," https://talktothe.city/.

[21] AI Objectives Institute, "AI Assembly 2023 Workshops," Talk to the City, 2023, https://talktothecity.org/report/ai-assembly-2023-workshops_1-translations.

[22] AI Objectives Institute, "Talk to the City," https://talktothe.city/. For a case study of T3C deployment in Taiwan, see AI Objectives Institute, "Taiwan 2024 DPP Party – Post Presidential Election Politics Analysis (In Chinese)," https://talktothecity.org/report/taiwan-2024-dpp-ZH.

[23] Glen Weyl, interview by TBS CROSS DIG with Bloomberg, "Japan and Taiwan's Democracy and Digital Innovation (In Japanese)," YouTube, May 31, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gTWqbdfTc2g.

[24] Yu, Chihhao. "Chihhao Yu: Profile." Global Taiwan Institute. https://globaltaiwan.org/member/chihhao-yu/.



Part 3
Information Integrity

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all face growing pressure on the integrity of the information space, especially from AI-enabled disinformation and foreign influence operations, but they differ in the nature of the threat, the form of response, and the main sources of vulnerability. In Japan, AI-generated disinformation and biased content are increasingly seen as risks to social stability and national security, yet legal responses remain cautious and continue to rely largely on voluntary measures and self-regulation because of the need to balance countermeasures with freedom of expression. In South Korea, institutional responses have been more rapid and coordinated, but the weakening of independent fact-checking has emerged as a major structural vulnerability. Although there are some signs of possible reconstruction, the broader fact-checking ecosystem has not yet recovered. In Taiwan, PRC-linked foreign information manipulation constitutes the central threat, and responses have combined legal reforms with extensive civil society efforts in fact-checking, prebunking, research, and media literacy. Even so, these initiatives remain constrained by insufficient platform regulation and inadequate funding for fact-checking.

1. Japan

1.1. Risk Recognition

AI-generated disinformation, misinformation, and biased content are recognized as risks that may affect decision-making and destabilize society. In Japan, these risks have been acknowledged in government guidelines, including the AI Business Guidelines, which highlight[1] concerns related to social stability, human rights, and cultural diversity.

1.2. Countermeasures and Their Tension with Freedom of Expression

Countermeasures have been developed mainly through voluntary efforts. In its 2020 concluding report, a study group on digital platforms established in 2016 under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications emphasized (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2020) the role of voluntary measures by private actors in addressing online content issues, reflecting a cautious approach to government intervention in light of freedom of expression. This direction contributed to the establishment of the Japan Fact-Check Center (JFC). Legislation also reflected the government's reluctance to intervene. The Information Distribution Platform Act, enacted in 2024, requires platform operators to respond more promptly to rights-infringing content and to ensure transparency in content removal standards and their implementation, but its scope is confined to illegal or harmful content and does not fully address disinformation.

Policy discussions to advance countermeasures have faced difficulties. A study group established in 2023 under Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) proposed (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2024) measures such as content moderation and advertising regulation, but Nikkei reported (Sakai 2024) that the group was dissolved as coordination became increasingly complex, particularly in balancing countermeasures with freedom of expression. A subsequent group suggested (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2025b) clarifying illegal information and encouraging voluntary codes of conduct by platforms, but concrete regulatory measures remain underdeveloped. Asahi reported (Wakae 2025)

[1] Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan. 2025. "AI Guidelines for Business (Ver. 1.1): Appendix." April 4. https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/001003029.pdf.

that the final report ultimately prioritized non-binding "voluntary codes of conduct," and that even a previously suggested pathway toward stricter regulation was removed. Reportedly, this shift reflects both the difficulty of drawing boundaries in relation to freedom of expression and broader political constraints, including concerns about U.S. opposition to platform regulation.

In contrast, traditional media organizations have begun to take a more proactive role. Amid the increasing spread of disinformation and misinformation, they have become more active in fact-checking during elections since 2025. Historically, many outlets avoided fact-checking to preserve neutrality. Consequently, 2025 is often described (NHK 2025) as the first year in which systematic fact-checking was widely implemented during elections, while the impact is likely to be limited and may even inadvertently contribute to increased public exposure to misinformation.

1.3. National Security and Technological Approaches

Reportedly, this shift reflects both the difficulty of drawing boundaries in relation to freedom of expression and broader political constraints, including concerns about U.S. opposition to platform regulation.

At the same time, responses from a national security perspective have developed in parallel. Disinformation was recognized (Cabinet Secretariat of Japan 2022) as a national security issue in the National Security Strategy in 2022, and efforts have been made across ministries. The government has also moved to (Kyodo News 2026) strengthen intelligence functions, and it has reported that a specialized unit addressing disinformation has been established. However, existing measures remain limited in scope. For example, the Ministry of Defense has primarily focused (Ministry of Defense of Japan N.d.) on publishing fact-checking information related to disinformation targeting itself

Technical responses have also been promoted. MIC has supported (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications N.d.) the development of technologies to detect and mitigate disinformation. The AI Safety Institute (AISI) has developed evaluation frameworks (Japan AI Safety Institute 2025a) that incorporate risks such as harmful content, misinformation, bias, fairness, and inclusiveness, and has also issued guidance on red-teaming (Japan AI Safety Institute 2025b) from an adversarial

perspective. Private-sector collaborations, such as Frontria, have further contributed to these efforts.

Despite these initiatives, current responses remain insufficient relative to the scale of AI-driven information risks. Existing measures are fragmented across voluntary initiatives, limited regulatory frameworks, and security-oriented responses, and have yet to form a comprehensive approach to safeguarding the integrity of the information environment.

2. South Korea

2.1. Crisis of Independent Fact-Checking

South Korea's independent fact-checking ecosystem is facing a critical contraction. The SNU FactCheck Center, previously the nation's central verification hub, entered an indefinite pause (Kim 2024) in 2024 following the withdrawal of financial support from Naver (Lim 2023). This followed the 2023 dissolution of FactCheckNet (Ju 2025), which suffered from both public budget cuts and intense political accusations of partisan bias from conservative circles. Consequently, neutral, third-party verification has weakened, as increasing political polarization makes maintaining a non-partisan truth-seeking ecosystem financially and socially difficult. While these setbacks have weakened neutral verification, a new momentum for revival is surfacing. The Korea Media and Communications Commission (KMCC) is currently spearheading the establishment of a "Transparency Center" aimed at reactivating private-sector fact-checking and ensuring the reliability of digital information (Korea Communications Commission 2025).

Consequently, neutral, third-party verification has weakened, as increasing political polarization makes maintaining a non-partisan truth-seeking ecosystem financially and socially difficult.

2.2. Regulatory Legislation and Multi-Agency Response

South Korea has implemented a series of measures to counter AI-generated disinformation, responding to the rapid evolution of the technology. The government introduced an AI-generated content labeling policy (Lee 2025) as an initial step. This was reinforced by the KMCC's launch of a 24-hour fast-track system in late 2025 (Lee 2025), which prioritized the swift review and administrative blocking of deceptive AI advertisements. Countering disinformation is further expanded to protecting democratic values, especially to maintaining neutral settings for ballots. Following the 2023 enactment of the Public Official Election Act, which stipulated a 90-day pre-election ban on deepfakes, the National Election Commission (NEC) adopted a specialized AI model designed to detect deepfake content. "Aegis" was developed by National Forensic Service and Korea Electronics Technology Institute in order to safeguard the electoral environment. In February 2026, the scope of response was broadened with a pan-governmental meeting involving MSIT, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, the Ministry of Justice, and KMCC to strengthen enforcement and penalties (Korea Communications Commission 2026). In parallel, public-private cooperation has intensified as well, such as AI Safety Institute and Kakao co-developing real-time detection tools (Jang 2025). These tools are slated for open-source distribution to the NEC and the private sector to enhance collective resilience against disinformation.

While Korea has generated significant regulatory momentum through the rollout of AI content labeling, KMCC's fast-track system, and pan-governmental coordination, the long-term effectiveness of these measures against evolving disinformation remains to be proven.

While Korea has generated significant regulatory momentum through the rollout of AI content labeling, KMCC's fast-track system, and pan-governmental coordination, the long-term effectiveness of these measures against evolving disinformation remains to be proven. This institutional progress is currently tested by a deeply embedded structural vulnerability, such as the collapse of the nation's fact-checking infrastructure, driven by sustained political attacks on its legitimacy and a total withdrawal of financial support. Although the KMCC's Transparency Center offers a potential path for revival, the precarious conditions that caused the

original collapse persist, leaving the long-term sustainability of the ecosystem uncertain. Ultimately, while Korea demonstrates a strong capacity for top-down administrative coordination, sustaining a truly pluralistic and independent verification ecosystem remains a major hurdle that depends as much on a stable political and financial environment as it does on technological solutions.

3. Taiwan

3.1. Threat Structure and Recent Trends

However, since support for unification remains low in Taiwan, the focus has increasingly shifted toward polarizing Taiwanese society and weakening democracy from within.

The principal threat to the integrity of Taiwan's information space can be identified as influence operations originating from the PRC. According to Tim Niven[2], the PRC's FIMI targeting Taiwan operates through a three-layered structure. At the first level are strategic objectives, including the promotion of unification, the erosion of trust in democracy, and the creation of anxiety about Taiwan's future. At the second level are deeper narratives, such as claims that the government is corrupt, elections are rigged, the military is weak, and the United States would not come to Taiwan's aid. At the third level are granular stories—such as failures in military training or scandals involving political candidates—which are presented as if they were concrete evidence substantiating those broader narratives.

A further important point is that the character of the PRC's information operations has changed in recent years; earlier propaganda more directly emphasized the supposed appeal of unification (Niven 2023). However, since support for unification remains low in Taiwan, the focus has increasingly shifted toward polarizing Taiwanese society and weakening democracy from within.

[2] Niven, Tim. "Tim Niven, PhD: Google Scholar Profile." Google Scholar. https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=B9vqlpwAAAAJ&hl=en.

3.2. The Intensification of Threats through Social Media and AI

One important channel through which FIMI operates in Taiwan is the amplification of narratives through influencers and other actors embedded within Taiwanese society, rather than solely through propaganda imposed from outside. As Tim Niven of Doublethink Lab explained in an interview, the PRC may support the circulation of pro-PRC narratives through local collaborators and influencers, both before and after dissemination, including through financial support. On platforms such as TikTok, which are especially influential among younger audiences, a "propaganda economy" can emerge in which pro-PRC narratives are amplified through attention, engagement, and monetization. Although no direct financial link to the PRC has been publicly confirmed, the case of the China-born influencer yaya in Taiwan illustrates the issue; after publicly advocating military unification, her dependent residency permit was revoked and she was ordered to leave Taiwan (National Immigration Agency 2025).

As a result, they become more susceptible to anger and other affective reactions, making reasoned public debate more difficult and rendering democracy more vulnerable.

A second major concern is the way AI degrades the information environment more broadly, beyond the spread of individual falsehoods. As Summer Chen[3] of FactLink noted in an interview, AI is used in at least four ways. First, it enables direct fabrication, such as fake videos or audio recordings of politicians. Second, it produces AI-generated mini clips (Li, Chen, and Ma 2025), propaganda that provokes anger, anxiety, or ridicule; even in the absence of clear factual claims, such content can distort political perception. Third, it generates large volumes of low-quality "AI slop," often circulated through short-form video platforms, which undermines concentration, crowds out credible information, and degrades the quality of public deliberation. Fourth, it facilitates the operation of fake accounts and other forms of automated information manipulation. As Summer noted, people may recognize that such content is AI-generated and untrue, yet still consume it with little concern. As a result, they become more susceptible to anger and other affective reactions, making reasoned public debate more difficult and rendering democracy more vulnerable.

[3] Chen, Summer. "Summer Chen: Profile." Global Taiwan Institute. https://globaltaiwan.org/member/summer-chen/.

3.3. Government Responses

In response to these challenges, the Taiwanese government has increasingly relied on legal and institutional measures. In particular, between late 2022 and 2023, amendments to the Public Officials Election and Recall Act (Public Officials Election and Recall Act 2026) and the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election and Recall Act (Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election and Recall Act 2023) strengthened the legal framework for responding to election interference involving deepfakes and expanded regulation of election-related content on digital platforms. These developments build on the Anti-Infiltration Act (Anti-Infiltration Act 2020), which came into force in 2020 and prohibits political and election-related activities conducted under the direction, commission, or financial support of foreign hostile forces. In addition, Article 53 of the Disaster Prevention and Protection Act (Disaster Prevention and Protection Act, Art. 53) addresses false information during disasters, while Article 63(1)(5) of the Social Order Maintenance Act (Social Order Maintenance Act 2025) addresses rumors that disturb public order. MODA has also warned the public against downloading unnecessary Chinese apps and platforms such as TikTok, Douyin, and RedNote (Chiu and Chung 2025).

Alongside these government measures, civil society has developed a diverse range of responses.

3.4. Civil Society Responses

Alongside these government measures, civil society has developed a diverse range of responses. Some organizations focus primarily on debunking and fact-checking. TFC[4], which was co-founded in 2018 by the Taiwan Media Watch Foundation and the Association for Quality Journalism, relies primarily on claim-by-claim debunking—that is, the verification and refutation of individual claims. At the same time, it engages in international cooperation through initiatives such as the Youth Verification Challenge[5]. MyGoPen[6] provides verification services directly to the

[4] Taiwan FactCheck Center. "Home." https://en.tfc-taiwan.org.tw/.

[5] Niven, Tim. "Tim Niven, PhD: Google Scholar Profile." Google Scholar. https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=B9vqlpwAAAAJ&hl=en.

[6] MyGoPen. "MyGoPen: Fact-Checking and Rumor Clarification Platform, Taiwan." https://www.mygopen.com/.

public through LINE-based responses and chatbot functions. Both TFC and MyGoPen have benefited from support through Meta's Third-Party Fact-Checking Program (Li and Chen 2025).

Other civil society actors place greater emphasis on prebunking, narrative analysis, and research on the broader structure of information manipulation. As Summer Chen of FactLink[7] explained in an interview, FactLink[8] pays greater attention to the broader narratives that underpin recurring patterns of PRC disinformation, rather than focusing on individual cases. To this end, it develops narrative-based playbooks (Li, Chen, and Ma 2026), collaborates with specialists on Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) tools, publishes AI image verification guidelines (FactLink 2025), and provides capacity-building for journalists and educators. Doublethink Lab[9], a Taiwanese civil society research organization focused on the PRC's digital influence operations, also engages in international collaboration. According to Tim Niven in an interview, it uses agentic AI to partially automate the identification of fake accounts and media networks. IORG[10] likewise plays an important role in researching and analyzing PRC information operations and Taiwan's broader information environment.

While the government has strengthened legal frameworks in recent years, institutional responses to influencer-driven propaganda economies and affective content remain insufficient.

3.5. Future Prospects

Taken together, Taiwan's responses to information threats can be characterized as a distributed model supported by government institutions, civil society organizations, researchers, and international networks. While the government has strengthened legal frameworks in recent years, institutional responses to influencer-driven propaganda economies and affective content remain insufficient.

---

[7] Chen, Summer. "Summer Chen: Profile." Global Taiwan Institute. https://globaltaiwan.org/member/summer-chen/.

[8] FactLink. "FactLink 數位素養實驗室: Digital Investigation, AI Literacy, Media Literacy." https://www.factlink.tw/.

[9] Doublethink Lab. "Doublethink Lab: Strengthen Democracy Through Enhancing Digital Defenses." https://doublethinklab.org/.

[10] IORG (Taiwan Information Environment Research Center). "A Guide to Information Literacy: Exploration and Survival in Taiwan's Information Environment." https://iorg.tw/book.

At the same time, civil society actors face severe financial constraints, as well as a broader decline in the legitimacy and public acceptance of fact-checking itself. As Huian Ho of TFC[11] noted in an interview, Meta's January 2025 announcement (Kaplan 2025) that it would end cooperation with third-party fact-checkers in the United States generated anxiety within Taiwan's fact-checking community and prompted budget cuts as organizations prepared for future uncertainty. Despite these challenges, Taiwanese organizations continue to build information integrity coalitions through collaboration with domestic experts, journalists, educators, and international partners. These efforts constitute an important foundation for strengthening resilience.

[11] Ho, Huian. "Huian Ho: Speaker Profile." NECE – Networking European Civic Education. https://nece.eu/speaker/huian-ho/.



Part 4
Cyber Security

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all place growing emphasis on cybersecurity, but they differ in their principal threat perceptions, responses, and remaining weaknesses. In Japan, the threat picture is broad, including cyberattacks on critical infrastructure and AI-related risks, and the response has become more government-led through the Active Cyber Defense framework and the 2025 Cybersecurity Strategy, albeit with concerns over expanded state powers and the secrecy of communications. In South Korea, the threat is centered primarily on North Korea, and the government has responded through its 2024 National Cybersecurity Strategy, which emphasizes offensive defense and stronger private-sector participation, but a weak legal foundation and fragmentation across ministries remain major constraints. In Taiwan, the principal threat comes from the PRC, where cyberattacks are understood as part of a broader hybrid threat environment combining infrastructure disruption with disinformation and other gray-zone tactics; accordingly, Taiwan has strengthened its cybersecurity legislation and resilience-oriented governance, though it continues to face unusually intense and persistent cross-domain pressure.

1. Japan

1.1. Expanding Role of the State in Cybersecurity

Japan is strengthening state capacity in cybersecurity while defining procedural limits on information use as a democratic society. In this context, AI is framed as something to be protected, a tool to be leveraged, and an emerging source of threat.

The enactment of legislation on active cyber defense in May 2025 marked an important institutional development (Cabinet Secretariat of Japan N.d.b). This permits early detection and neutralization of serious cyber threats under specified conditions. Police and the Self-Defense Forces are responsible for implementing neutralization. The policy expands the operational role of the state in cyberspace. At the same time, the framework raised questions concerning the constitutional protection of the secrecy of communications, which had allegedly hindered effective countermeasures (Tsuchiya 2025). Government advisory proposals (Cabinet Secretariat of Japan 2024) and parliamentary materials (Kakinuma 2025) highlighted the need to reconcile cybersecurity measures with constitutional protection of the secrecy of communications. The discussion focused on how communication data could be obtained and used under defined legal requirements, as well as on the design of oversight mechanisms and accountability procedures.

Japan is strengthening state capacity in cybersecurity while defining procedural limits on information use as a democratic society.

1.2. AI in Cybersecurity

Japan revised its Cybersecurity Strategy in December 2025 and clarified the role of the state in responding to cyber threats (Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters 2025). The revised strategy assigns the national government a stronger coordinating function and introduces active cyber defense as a central element of policy. The strategy situates AI within cybersecurity policy in three ways: securing AI systems (Security for AI), using AI to improve defensive capacity (AI for Security), and addressing attacks that misuse AI. Policy measures include research and development, guideline formation, and international coordination. The government has stated that it will work with the AI Safety Institute and promote international

processes such as the Hiroshima AI Process. It also requires government agencies to manage risks when procuring and using generative AI.

AI has also been discussed in the context of economic security policy. The Economic Security Promotion Act enacted in May 2022 includes support for the development of critical technologies, including cloud programs, as one of its pillars. Based on the Act, to secure domestic computational resources for generative AI, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry has provided subsidies for private-sector investment in domestic cloud and computing infrastructure (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan N.d.). Discussions on revisions to the economic security framework have also addressed the protection of data centers and cloud services including measures to prevent external interference, information leakage, and data loss, as well as mechanisms for the government to monitor the location and status of data center facilities.

2. South Korea

2.1. Legislative and Administrative Stagnation

South Korea's cybersecurity posture is currently defined as bold strategic ambition and a persistent legislative stagnation. While the 2024 National Cybersecurity Strategy (Office of National Security 2024) advocates for a bold "offensive defense," the nation's international standing remains surprisingly low on the Cybersecurity Strategy Scorecard (Heiding, O'Neill, and Price 2025) compared to global peers. This lag is primarily attributed to a decade-long delay in policy formulation and a lack of sustained public engagement and communication. Intensifying this situation, the National Cybersecurity Basic Act has remained in a state of legislative paralysis since 2006 (Kim 2024). This deadlock stems from intense inter-agency power struggles for organizational leadership and dominance, leaving a critical void in the unified legal framework required for effective administrative execution (Shin 2025).

South Korea's cybersecurity posture is currently defined as bold strategic ambition and a persistent legislative stagnation.

2.2. Countering North Korean Threats through Private-Public Synergy and AI

While Korea's 2024 strategy targets a bold "offensive defense," it currently lacks a concrete operational blueprint, relying on aspirational language without the necessary budgets or specific agency assignments to ensure implementation.

Faced with an existential threat environment where North Korean actors accounted for approximately 80% of public cyberattacks (KBS 2024), Korea is rapidly evolving its defense paradigm. These attacks have moved beyond individual targets to strike core national infrastructure, including judicial and administrative networks. In response, private sector engagement is becoming increasingly active, moving away from a state-mandated approach. Collaborative frameworks such as the Korea Cyber Security Alliance (Bang 2025) and Information Security Companies Autonomous Security Council (Jo 2025) now facilitate real-time threat intelligence sharing between the major industries and government. This evolution is further accelerated by AI-driven innovation, illustrated by the 2025 AI Cyber Defense Contest (Korea Internet & Security Agency 2025).

While Korea's 2024 strategy targets a bold "offensive defense," it currently lacks a concrete operational blueprint, relying on aspirational language without the necessary budgets or specific agency assignments to ensure implementation. This strategic void is further widened by the legislative paralysis surrounding the National Cybersecurity Act, which remains stalled due to intense inter-agency power struggles. Conversely, the persistent threat from North Korea is forcing practical progress where legislation remains lacking, fostering active private sector engagement out of necessity. However, without a unified legal framework, these efforts remain fragmented across various ministries, leaving the system structurally exposed. Ultimately, the fundamental challenge to a robust cybersecurity posture lies in institutional coherence rather than technical capability. Until these legislative deadlocks are resolved, even the most comprehensive attempts at public-private cooperation will be hindered by the very structural limitation.

3. Taiwan

3.1. PRC Cyber Operations and Hybrid Threats

Taiwan's cybersecurity environment is increasingly shaped by persistent PRC cyber operations and broader hybrid threats. According to Taiwan's National Security Bureau (NSB), cyberattacks originating from the PRC against Taiwan's critical infrastructure—including hospitals, banks, energy systems, and other key sectors—rose to an average of 2.63 million intrusion attempts per day in 2025, a 6 percent increase over the previous year (National Security Bureau of Taiwan 2025). Reuters reports that these operations reportedly intensified around PRC military exercises and Taiwan's major political events, reinforcing Taiwan's view that cyber operations form part of a broader strategy of hybrid coercion (Reuters 2026). Several incidents illustrate this threat. In January 2024, the semiconductor-related firm Foxsemicon was hit by a ransomware attack in which its website was defaced and the attackers threatened to publish customer and employee information (Wang 2024). In February 2025, Mackay Memorial Hospital in Taipei was also struck by ransomware, and later reports raised concerns over the possible leakage of approximately 16.6 million documents (Hiciano 2025). According to Taipei Times, later in April 2025, Taiwanese authorities identified Lo Chengyu as the suspect behind the attack, marking the first public identification of a Chinese hacker by Taiwanese law enforcement in such a case (Chung 2025).

Moreover, cyber operations in Taiwan are not treated merely as attempts to disrupt systems or steal data; they are also linked to influence operations and disinformation.

Moreover, cyber operations in Taiwan are not treated merely as attempts to disrupt systems or steal data; they are also linked to influence operations and disinformation. In its analysis of the PRC's 2025 cognitive warfare tactics against Taiwan, NSB reported (National Security Bureau of Taiwan 2026) that during the April 2025 military exercises, PRC-linked actors hijacked more than ten PTT Bulletin Board System accounts and used compromised IoT devices and rented overseas servers to spread false narratives, including that the PRC had blocked Taiwan's natural gas shipments and that Chinese warships had entered Taiwan's 24-

nautical-mile zone[1]. Therefore, Taiwan's cyber threat environment is understood as a compound security challenge in which infrastructure disruption and information manipulation are closely intertwined.

3.2. Cybersecurity in Taiwan's Resilience Strategy

Against this background, cybersecurity has come to be positioned as a core component of Taiwan's broader resilience strategy. The Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee, announced by the Presidential Office in June 2024, was established to ensure that both government and society can continue to function during national emergencies or natural disasters (Office of the President of the Republic of China N.d.). In a September 2025 speech, President Lai Ching-te explicitly identified "cyber and financial security" as one of the committee's five principal lines of effort. This prioritization is also reflected in Taiwan's AI governance framework (Lai 2025). The AI Basic Act, which entered into force in January 2026 (Artificial Intelligence Basic Act 2026), sets out seven governance principles in Article 4, one of which is "cybersecurity and safety." The Act requires that AI research, development, and deployment incorporate cybersecurity safeguards, prevent security threats and attacks, and ensure the robustness and safety of AI systems.

3.3. Strengthening Taiwan's Cybersecurity Law

Against this background, cybersecurity has come to be positioned as a core component of Taiwan's broader resilience strategy.

At the legal level, the Cyber Security Management Act remains Taiwan's core cybersecurity statute (Cyber Security Management Act 2025). It was enacted as Taiwan's first cybersecurity-specific law and took effect on 1 January 2019 under the Executive Yuan. It applies not only to government agencies, but also to critical infrastructure providers, state-owned enterprises, and other designated non-governmental entities. In 2022, much of its supervisory authority was transferred to MODA.

[1] PTT (批踢踢實業坊). "PTT: Taiwan's Largest Online Forum." https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/index.html.

A major shift came with the 2025 amendment, which elevated the regulation of high-risk digital products from administrative practice to statutory law. Article 3(11) defines "products harmful to national cyber security" as information and communications systems, services, or products that pose a direct or indirect risk to national cybersecurity and may affect government operations or social stability (Stellex Law Firm 2025). Article 11 prohibits government agencies from downloading, installing, or using such products, except in narrowly defined cases where no alternative exists and specific approval has been granted. Pursuant to Article 11(3), the Regulations for the Review of Products Harmful to National Cyber Security were issued in December 2025, further specifying review procedures, risk assessment, intelligence sharing, and use restrictions (Regulations for Review of Products Harmful to National Cyber Security 2025).

These legal changes were quickly connected to the regulation of Chinese digital products. Taipei Times reported that in December 2025, MODA publicly warned that Douyin[2], RedNote[3], Sina Weibo[4], Weixin[5], and Baidu Cloud[6] posed serious information-security risks and stated that government agencies were prohibited from downloading, installing, or using these applications on official devices and networks (Chiu and Chung 2025). Although MODA had already restricted the use of TikTok-related applications in the public sector by 2022 (Ministry of Digital Affairs of Taiwan 2022), the 2025 revision strengthened their legal basis and facilitated their broader implementation.

[2] Douyin (抖音). "Douyin: Chinese Short-Video Platform." https://www.douyin.com/jingxuan.

[3] Xiaohongshu (小紅書). "Xiaohongshu (RED): Chinese Social Commerce Platform." https://www.xiaohongshu.com/explore.

[4] Weibo (微博). "Weibo: Chinese Microblogging Platform." https://weibo.com/.

[5] WeChat (微信). "WeChat: Chinese Messaging and Social Media Platform." https://weixin.qq.com/.

[6] Baidu AI Cloud. "Baidu AI Cloud: Cloud and AI Services." https://login.bce.baidu.com/?lang=en.



Part 5
Sovereign AI & Privacy

The governance of personal data and the pursuit of sovereign AI raise critical questions for democratic states regarding how to strengthen technological and economic capacity while safeguarding citizens' rights and preventing the misuse or external exploitation of data. Japan has a relatively advanced and still evolving personal data protection framework, while GENIAC reflects a sovereign AI strategy framed primarily around industrial competitiveness. South Korea has taken a proactive approach to sovereign AI, exemplified by the Independent AI Foundation Model Project, but continues to face strong privacy and surveillance concerns, as highlighted by the iRuda case. Taiwan most clearly links open data to sovereign AI development, as seen in the Act for the Promotion of Data Innovation and Utilization and TAIDE, while its PDPA regime is being strengthened but remains institutionally incomplete.

1. Japan

1.1. Personal Data Protection Revised in the AI Era

Japan is currently advancing reforms to its personal data protection framework in response to the rapid expansion of generative AI. The central policy question is how to facilitate AI development while maintaining effective safeguards against the misuse of personal information. The recent policy document indicates that the government seeks to revise consent requirements under the Personal Information Protection Law while simultaneously strengthening sanctions against abusive practices (Personal Information Protection Commission of Japan 2026).

The core proposal would allow, under limited conditions, the acquisition and third-party provision of sensitive personal data without individual consent when the purpose is restricted to statistical processing related to AI development. According to press reporting (Kawashima and Murai 2025), this change reflects industry concerns that existing consent rules impede large-scale data collection necessary for AI training. At the same time, the draft includes the introduction of a surcharge system targeting operators who intentionally misuse personal data for profit, additional safeguards for minors under 16, and procedural requirements for the handling of facial feature data. Although a collective redress mechanism was discussed during deliberations, it was not incorporated into the current proposal.

The core proposal would allow, under limited conditions, the acquisition and third-party provision of sensitive personal data without individual consent when the purpose is restricted to statistical processing related to AI development.

The appropriate use of personal data is also connected to a trustworthy democratic society. The 2025 AI Business Guidelines articulate expectations for responsible data practices (Office of National Security 2024). The Guidelines refer to overseas cases in which personal data collected through social media personality-quiz applications were used to classify individuals into behavioural groups and deliver targeted political messaging.

1.2. Sovereign AI under Development

In addition to personal data governance, Japan has also begun to pursue elements of a sovereign AI strategy. METI and the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) have promoted the Generative AI Accelerator Challenge (GENIAC)[1] to support the development of domestic foundation models and their social implementation. The AI Basic Plan similarly emphasizes strengthening national AI development capacity as one of its core policy directions (Cabinet Office of Japan 2025). Materials (Cabinet Office and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan 2026) in the working groups in the Growth Strategy (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2026) show that the government seeks to build a domestic AI ecosystem, including data, data centers, foundation models, and applications, in order to reduce reliance on foreign technologies and to ensure that AI systems reflect Japanese language, knowledge, and social contexts. However, these discussions are framed primarily in terms of industrial competitiveness and technological capability rather than personal data protection.

2. South Korea

2.1. Data Privacy Frontline

The AI privacy landscape is defined by the tension between data-driven innovation and information rights. The “iRUDA" case (Beopryul Shinmun 2021) remains a symbolic early instance of public distrust in AI data ethics. Currently, tech firms, including startups and the financial sector, argue that the traditional "consent" principle is a critical barrier to LLM development (Choi 2025), as individual consent for billions of data points is practically impossible. While the government’s "2025 AI Regulatory Rationalization Roadmap" seeks to mitigate legal risks for pseudonymized data (Government of the Republic of Korea 2025), civil society groups like People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy demand strict accountability for unauthorized data usage, ensuring innovation does not erode fundamental privacy (Civil Society Organizations 2021).

[1] Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan. "GENIAC: Generative AI Accelerator Challenge." https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/mono_info_service/geniac/index.html.

2.2. Sovereign AI and the Dilemma of Public AI Utilization

To secure data sovereignty, Korea strategically empowers domestic tech leaders and startups with computing resources like hardware and massive datasets to build a Sovereign AI ecosystem (Ministry of Science and ICT 2025b) independent of global Big Tech. Notably, under the Lee administration, the development of sovereign AI has elevated it as a core pillar of the national AI strategy (Ministry of Science and ICT 2025c), illustrated in the Independent AI Foundation Model Project (Ministry of Science and ICT 2026a). Simultaneously, public-sector AI is expanding physically such as smart cities that utilize AI-integrated CCTV networks for automated threat detection (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport 2024). While this raises significant surveillance concerns, in a move for democratic values, the government accepted the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK)'s advice (National Human Rights Commission of Korea 2024), banning real-time facial recognition in public agencies pending legislative action. This reflects a mature societal consensus that human rights and privacy must effectively counterbalance technological efficiency.

Consequently, Korea sits at a crossroads where administrative pragmatism and rights-based advocacy coexist uneasily.

Korea's high public tolerance for data-driven governance, reinforced by the large-scale mobilization of CCTV, credit card, and mobile data during the COVID-era, has significantly lowered societal friction for comprehensive data collection. On the contrary, this trend exists alongside deep structural tensions, where the "iRUDA" fallout and consistent civil society pushback reflect a landscape where data ethics remain genuinely contested. While the tentative ban on real-time facial recognition signals a degree of institutional self-restraint, the simultaneous expansion of smart cities suggests that such restraint is often selective and pragmatic rather than principled. Consequently, Korea sits at a crossroads where administrative pragmatism and rights-based advocacy coexist uneasily.

3. Taiwan

3.1. Data Utilization and Sovereign AI

Taiwan's data governance strategy has increasingly linked data circulation to the development of sovereign AI. In 2025, MODA published the draft Act for the Promotion of Data Innovation and Utilization (Ministry of Digital Affairs 2025), which seeks to institutionalize data flows in the AI era by improving open-data quality, promoting routine inter-agency and industry data sharing, standardizing licensing terms, and introducing Chief Data Officers across government. The draft also envisages an Executive Yuan Data Innovation and Utilization Advisory Council to coordinate data policy across ministries at the cabinet level.

These measures are significant not only because they facilitate data reuse, but also because they help build the training infrastructure needed for AI systems that reflect Taiwan's linguistic, institutional, and social context. In this sense, expanded data utilization is closely tied to Taiwan's broader sovereign AI agenda, which aims to reduce excessive reliance on foreign foundation models and non-local language data. This, in turn, may create greater room for Taiwan to govern sensitive industrial data (Murphy 2024) and citizen data in accordance with domestic institutions and values. At the center of this agenda is the Trustworthy AI Dialogue Engine (TAIDE)[2], which provides five core functions (Taiwan Panorama 2026)—Chinese-English and English-Chinese translation, email drafting, summarization, and writing assistance—and is explicitly designed to strengthen understanding of Taiwanese language and culture. In addition, MODA announced in December 2025 the launch of the Taiwan Sovereign AI Training Corpus (Ministry of Digital Affairs 2025), which aggregates more than 2,000 datasets and over 600 million tokens from more than 200 government agencies, thereby furnishing a more robust training base for sovereign AI development.

[2] TAIDE. "TAIDE: Trustworthy AI Dialogue Engine, Taiwan." https://taide.tw/en.

3.2. Privacy and Surveillance Concerns

At the same time, however, the expansion of data utilization and sovereign AI has generated growing tension with personal data protection. In Taiwan, a 2023 amendment to the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) created the legal basis for an Independent Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC) to become the competent authority (Legislative Yuan 2025), and in December 2023 the government established the Preparatory Office of the PDPC[3] to lay the groundwork for its future operation. A further partial amendment to the PDPA (Chang and Hsiung 2025), submitted by the Executive Yuan in March 2025 and passed by the Legislative Yuan in November 2025, strengthened the rules on breach notification, response measures, and record retention. Nevertheless, as of November 2025, the Preparatory Office of the PDPC (Personal Data Protection Commission Preparatory Office 2025) had still not been formally established, because the legislation required for its establishment had not yet completed the legislative process.

At the same time, however, the expansion of data utilization and sovereign AI has generated growing tension with personal data protection.

Yet, while these developments reflect Taiwan's effort to strengthen privacy protection at the institutional level, they have not eliminated emerging risks associated with new forms of data use. Privacy concerns have also surfaced in the political sphere. According to TFC, controversy erupted in late May 2024 after DPP politician Wang Yi-chuan suggested that the ages and other characteristics of protesters near the Legislative Yuan could be inferred through mobile signaling data, prompting criticism that such analysis could amount to political surveillance. The ensuing debate centered on the legal basis for accessing such data, as well as on the effectiveness of consent and anonymization safeguards.

[3] Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC), Taiwan. https://www.pdpc.gov.tw/en/.



Part 6
Copyright & Intellectual Property Rights

Approaches to generative AI and copyright differ primarily in the degree of legal certainty surrounding AI training data. Japan provides the clearest framework through Article 30 (4) of the Copyright Act, which broadly permits the use of copyrighted works for machine learning, although debates over intellectual property and creators' rights remain ongoing. South Korea faces a regulatory gap, and conflicts between platforms and creators have been surfacing. In Taiwan, the legality of AI training remains uncertain and is assessed under fair use. Together, these cases illustrate the broader tension between promoting AI innovation and protecting the informational foundations of democratic societies.

1. Japan

1.1. Permissive Environment for AI Training

However, the rapid spread of generative AI has raised societal concerns about potential copyright and intellectual property infringement.

Japan's approach to generative AI and copyright combines a relatively permissive legal framework for AI training with ongoing debates over the protection of creative industries and media outlets. The current policy discussion struggles to balance innovation in AI development with safeguarding authors' rights.

A distinctive feature of the Japanese system is the copyright exception for information analysis under Article 30-4 of the Copyright Act, which allows copyrighted works to be used without permission when processed for information analysis, including machine learning. Due to the broad scope of this exception, some have called Japan a "machine learning paradise." (Ueno 2021) This provision, introduced in 2018 to promote technological progress, is seen by by some as inappropriate in the AI era (Takabe 2025).

However, the rapid spread of generative AI has raised societal concerns about potential copyright and intellectual property infringement. In response, the Agency for Cultural Affairs issued guidance in 2023 (Japan Copyright Office 2024). It clarifies that, while AI training continues to fall under the information-analysis exception, AI outputs could still infringe copyright if, for example, a system is designed to produce works similar to those used in training. Nonetheless, the legal system remains favorable toward the interests of AI developers.

1.2. Ongoing Debates on the Rights-Protective Proposal on Intellectual Rights

However, the newly proposed guideline on property rights adopts a more rights-based approach and has become a subject of controversy. In 2025, the government proposed a draft of the principal code (Ueno 2024) framework for AI developers, which appears to be quite strict. Instead of statutory obligations, the code encourages a compliance-or-explain approach that urges companies to respect rights holders' interests. The draft requires AI developers and providers to disclose overviews of their models and training data, provide additional information if requested, and explain non-compliance with the code.

Concerns are mounting that this trend significantly widens the gap in access to high-quality data between large corporations with superior capital and resource-lacking companies.

Different stakeholders hold varying views. Industry groups (Japan Association of New Economy 2026) worry that stricter rules could limit AI growth, while newspaper publishers (Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association 2026) and creator organizations (NAFCA 2026) generally support stronger copyright protections. The publishers even call for enhanced safeguards. Meanwhile, some believe the draft is unrealistic for AI developers in the first place and question the efficacy of the domestic approach, as the issue is transnational (Nikkei 2026a). How the policy debate will resolve remains uncertain.

With technologies like Sora2 enabling anyone to produce high-quality content, (1) the creative industry (Japan Animation Association et al. 2025) warns that generative AI could threaten employment for artists and media professionals if AI systems are trained on existing works without permission, transparency, or compensation. These concerns can extend beyond copyright, as a decline in professional creative work might undermine the cultural and informational fabric essential to democratic societies.

On the other hand, AI technology may protect creators' rights. It has been reported that Sony AI has been developing a system that detects copyrights infringement by LLMs and ensures fair compensation for creators (Nikkei 2026b).

2. South Korea

2.1. Legislative Shortcomings and the Widening Data Divide

The South Korean government maintains a permissive stance toward AI development through regulatory rationalization. However, the National Assembly Research Service has criticized the inadequate management of corresponding copyright frameworks (Baek 2025). This legislative vacuum has offered incentives on companies to shift toward contract-based data usage to mitigate legal risks (National Assembly Research Service 2025). Concerns are mounting that this trend significantly widens the gap in access to high-quality data between large corporations with superior capital and resource-lacking companies. Such a disparity risks solidifying a data

monopoly centered around mega platforms.

2.2. Structural Conflicts between Platforms and Creators

Ultimately, Korea's innovation-first approach is creating real structural casualties, signaling that sustainable AI development will require frameworks that go beyond corporate risk mitigation, including actively broadening data access and giving creators meaningful legal protection.

Structural conflicts are intensifying between platforms seeking to utilize content for AI training and creators striving to protect their intellectual property. For instance, platforms like Naver have faced backlash (Lim 2023) for using hosted works to provide AI services that replicate specific artistic styles provided by authors distributing on their platforms. On the other hand, groups such as the Korea Webtoon Author Association have condemned these practices (KBS News 2023), arguing that they push creators, who are placed in subordinate contractual positions, into a corner. This friction highlights a power asymmetry where platforms leverage their distribution dominance, underscoring the urgent need for a framework that balances technological utility with the rights of creators.

Beyond just creating uncertainty, Korea's current copyright vacuum acts as a structural accelerator. It quietly advantages those with existing capital, potentially turning AI into a new dimension where the gap between large corporations and smaller players, in talent and infrastructure, widens further. This disparity is rooted in a profound structural power asymmetry, where the dominant distributing platforms assume actual superiority over intellectual property rights, leaving subordinate creators to bear a disproportionate share of AI's negative influence. Ultimately, Korea's innovation-first approach is creating real structural casualties, signaling that sustainable AI development will require frameworks that go beyond corporate risk mitigation, including actively broadening data access and giving creators meaningful legal protection.

3. Taiwan

3.1. Legal and Institutional Framework

Taiwan's legal framework governing AI and copyright is currently shaped primarily by interpretations of the existing Copyright Act (Legislative Yuan 2022), rather than by AI-specific statutory provisions. The Act grants copyright holders' exclusive rights such as the right of reproduction (Article 22), the right of public transmission (Article 26 (1)), and the rights of adaptation and compilation (Article 28). Accordingly, copyright may be implicated at several stages of AI development, including data collection and reproduction, the use of copyrighted works for training, and the distribution or adaptation of AI-generated outputs.

With regard to the copyrightability of AI-generated works, the Taiwan Intellectual Property Office (TIPO) Email No.1140522c (Intellectual Property Office 2025) stated that where a work is generated entirely through AI computation, without human intellectual or creative contribution, it does not qualify for copyright protection. At the same time, TIPO Email No.1111031 explained that where AI is used only as an assistive tool and the creator contributes creative input to the final work, copyright protection may still apply.

The legal status of AI training, however, remains much more uncertain. As Yasuto Shirae notes (Shirae 2025), Taiwan does not have an express exception comparable to Article 30 (4) of Japan's Copyright Act for information analysis or AI training (National Diet 1970). Instead, the legality of AI training is assessed case by case under the Fair Use provision of Article 65 of the Copyright Act. Article 65(2) requires consideration of four factors: the purpose and nature of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and the effect of the use on the work's market value. As of March 2026, no publicly available Taiwanese court decision appears to have definitively resolved whether the use of copyrighted works for generative AI training qualifies as fair use under Article 65 of the Copyright Act.

3.2. Illustrative Cases

One illustrative case concerns TAIDE and the management of copyright-related legal risk. This legal uncertainty is reflected in the development of Taiwan's sovereign AI project, TAIDE[1]. Yasuto Shirae argues that the training of large language models such as TAIDE cannot safely be assumed to fall within fair use and may therefore require authorization from rights holders (Shirae 2025). TAIDE's own disclosures suggest an awareness of this risk. The TAIDE website[2] lists numerous government and private-sector institutions as cooperating data providers, and some pages on its training data[3] explicitly state that the materials were provided under authorization. In addition, the TAIDE team stated that the TAIDE-LX-7B model was trained on text data lawfully licensed through consultations with government agencies and private publishers (TAIDE 2024). TAIDE can thus be understood as a case in which legal uncertainty surrounding fair use is managed through licensing and data provenance control.

More broadly, however, the case highlights the absence of clear legal rules in Taiwan governing the use of news content for generative AI training, particularly with regard to authorization, compensation, and copyright clearance.

A second illustrative case can be found in disputes over the use of news content as training data. These tensions are particularly visible in the news industry. The Central News Agency (CNA)[4] stated that approximately 140,000 of its news articles published between 2011 and 2021 had been included without authorization in the Traditional Chinese dataset fineweb-zhtw (Lin et al. 2024). CNA requested the removal of the materials and filed a criminal complaint; it argued that news should not be treated merely as a resource for extraction, but as a public good deserving respect and protection. According to CNA[5], the dispute was resolved in

[1] TAIDE. "TAIDE: Trustworthy AI Dialogue Engine, Taiwan." https://taide.tw/en.

[2] TAIDE. "TAIDE Training Data." https://taide.tw/public/training-data.

[3] TAIDE. "TAIDE Training Data Details." https://taide.tw/public/training-data_show?id=4b1141869c45c11c019c466de42c0011.

[4] *Central News Agency* (CNA) Taiwan. July 7, 2025. Facebook post. https://www.facebook.com/cnanewstaiwan/posts/1127939982697899.

[5] *Central News Agency* (CNA) Taiwan. July 11, 2025. Facebook post. https://www.facebook.com/cnanewstaiwan/posts/1131023115722919.

July 2025 after the opposing party acknowledged the copyright infringement and deleted the relevant materials. More broadly, however, the case highlights the absence of clear legal rules in Taiwan governing the use of news content for generative AI training, particularly with regard to authorization, compensation, and copyright clearance.



Part 7
Media

AI is increasingly affecting the role of the media as a watchdog of power, particularly through its implications for copyright protection and the public's right to know. However, adequate measures to ensure the sustainability of news organizations remain limited. Different challenges and responses have emerged across countries, including technological and fact-checking initiatives in Japan and regulatory gaps in the governance of new media in South Korea. Taiwan, meanwhile, has explored a different direction. After the failure of comprehensive platform regulation, legislative discussions have shifted toward a bargaining framework between news organizations and digital platforms. Yet the feasibility of this approach remains uncertain.

1. Japan

1.1. Concerns about AI

News organizations warn that such practices may reproduce articles without authorization, generate inaccurate outputs, and erode the credibility of original reporting.

Japanese news organizations have expressed sustained concern about the impact of generative AI on copyright, business sustainability, and the public's right to know. Statements issued by the Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association since 2023 point to confusion in the information space, privacy concerns, deficiencies in existing legal frameworks, and a lack of transparency (Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association 2023). The Association argues that the unauthorized use of news content in generative AI systems threatens the economic foundations of journalism and may reduce the availability of high-quality reporting that supports democratic processes. It maintains that news content constitutes intellectual property created through significant labor and cost, and that generative AI developers and service providers should obtain authorization and provide compensation when using such content. Although recent policy discussions and interpretative guidance on copyright and AI have clarified some issues, the Association (Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association 2024) considers existing protections insufficient and has called for legislative reform rather than reliance on interpretation alone.

Concerns have intensified (Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association 2025) with the expansion of retrieval-augmented generation and "zero-click search," in which users rely on AI-generated summaries without accessing original news sources. News organizations warn that such practices may reproduce articles without authorization, generate inaccurate outputs, and erode the credibility of original reporting. Litigation has followed these concerns: in August 2025, Yomiuri Shimbun (Yomiuri Shimbun 2025), followed by Nikkei and Asahi (Nikkei 2025a), filed lawsuits against Perplexity alleging copyright infringement. These cases highlight perceived gaps in copyright law and the uncertainty surrounding statutory exceptions, particularly provisions allowing certain uses without authorization.

1.2. Countermeasures and Their Limitations

Structural challenges remain, including legal ambiguity, platform practices, and the difficulty of countering misinformation without amplifying it.

Alongside legal advocacy, media organizations have pursued technical and institutional responses to protect information integrity. Many have participated in the development of OP (Originator Profile) technology [1], which embeds verified originator information into online content to strengthen traceability and authenticity. Fact-checking efforts have also expanded. In 2025, news organizations began coordinated fact-checking (Yomiuri Shimbun 2025) during elections with the cooperation of JFC, and more than 200 fact-check articles were published during the House of Councillors election in 2025 (NHK 2025).

However, empirical findings suggest limitations. Surveys indicate that a high proportion of individuals who encountered widely circulated false information during elections in 2025 (NHK 2025) and in 2026 (Jiji Press 2026) believed it to be true, and television remained a major exposure channel. This indicates that reporting on misinformation may inadvertently contribute to its wider recognition, while public trust in traditional media has been challenged in an attention-driven information environment.

The Japanese news industry frames generative AI as posing intertwined risks to copyright protection, economic sustainability, and democratic information functions. While advocating stronger legal safeguards, media organizations are also investing in authentication technologies and fact-checking initiatives. Structural challenges remain, including legal ambiguity, platform practices, and the difficulty of countering misinformation without amplifying it.

[1] Originator Profile Collaborative Innovation Partnership (OP-CIP), https://originator-profile.org/en-US/.

2. South Korea

2.1. Traditional Media and AI

Traditional media is actively integrating AI while striving to fulfill its public mandate of providing essential information for democracy. To uphold journalistic integrity, public and private sector entities, such as Korea Press Foundation and various press outlets, are collaboratively and individually establishing AI journalism guidelines (Kang 2024) and ethical standards. However, intensifying copyright disputes remains a critical burden. Despite the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism's interpretation (Lim 2025) that unauthorized AI summarization constitutes infringement, the government's "use-first, compensate-later" approach has fueled significant friction (Yoo 2026). This conflict is exemplified by the collective lawsuit (Choi 2025) from the three major broadcasting companies against Naver, highlighting the struggle over the fair valuation of journalistic assets in the AI era.

Moreover, while global platforms bear the ability to trap citizens in a polarized environment with engagement-based algorithms exacerbating the echo chamber effect, they lack direct responsibility for the AI-generated content they distribute.

2.2. The Regulatory Vacuum in New Media

Even with the AI Basic Act, a regulatory vacuum persists in the digital sphere. Current legislation (National AI Strategy Committee 2025) focuses on imposing mandates primarily on AI developers and service providers, failing to hold accountable the actual content producers, including news outlets and high-impact YouTubers, who create AI-driven narratives. This gap significantly hinders information transparency. Moreover, while global platforms bear the ability to trap citizens in a polarized environment with engagement-based algorithms exacerbating the echo chamber effect, they lack direct responsibility for the AI-generated content they distribute. Specifically, current safe harbor provisions (National Assembly 2025) allow these intermediaries to avoid proactive liability, while their limited cooperation with domestic investigations, hesitating to provide subscriber data for disinformation cases, further complicates legal efforts to identify and penalize malicious actors.

While Korea's push for AI journalism ethics signals an institutional commitment, this integrity remains functionally hollow without the infrastructure of enforceable copyright protections, leaving traditional media to bear the disproportionate burden of maintaining high editorial standards without sufficient legal recourse. On the other hand, the regulatory gap is also prominent in new media, focusing primarily on AI developers while allowing safe harbor protections to shield platforms. Ultimately, Korea's media governance finds itself caught between high-level ambition and structural permissiveness. Closing this divide will require a paradigm shift that extends legal and ethical accountability beyond the technology's developers to include both the platforms and the content producers themselves.

3. Taiwan

3.1. Challenges for Traditional News Media

Taiwan's news industry has become heavily dependent on multinational digital platforms such as Google and Meta for both distribution channels and advertising revenue. In 2021, the Legislative Yuan raised concerns that large digital platforms benefit from news content without fairly sharing the resulting advertising value with news organizations, placing traditional media under growing economic pressure (Tsai et al. 2025). China Times reported that, of Taiwan's digital advertising market, worth approximately NT$61 billion (US$1.87 billion), Google and Meta together account for NT$40–50 billion (US$1.23–1.54 billion), thereby placing significant pressure on media management (Zhuge 2025).

This pressure has been further intensified by the spread of generative AI. According to United Daily News (Yu 2026) and The Reporter (Hsieh and Chien 2026), since the introduction of Google's AI Overview, more users have begun leaving search results pages after reading AI-generated summaries alone, and some news websites have experienced declining click-through rates. Moreover, since generative AI can learn from large volumes of news content and produce summaries, rewrites, and personalized articles, it may increasingly become a central intermediary in the circulation of news. As AI agents come to read across multiple articles and generate responses tailored to users' requests, audiences may encounter not original reporting itself, but secondary information reconstituted by AI, thereby further

destabilizing the business foundations of news organizations.

In particular, provisions that would allow the removal of information or restriction of access generated serious concerns regarding freedom of expression.

In addition, in the Excellent Journalism Electronic Newsletter (Chen 2026), Lin Yu-Pen argues that news media are increasingly compelled to adjust headlines and content formats to platform preferences in order to secure visibility. As a result, adaptation to algorithms tends to take precedence over public value and professional editorial judgment, constituting a structural constraint on media autonomy.

3.2. The Failure of Comprehensive Regulation

In response to these developments, the need for digital platform regulation has been recognized in Taiwan. In June 2022, the National Communications Commission (NCC) released a draft of the Digital Intermediary Services Act (National Communications Commission 2022), conceived as a Taiwanese counterpart to the EU's Digital Services Act (Institute of Geoeconomics 2024), with the aim of comprehensively regulating platform accountability, transparency, and responses to illegal content. However, the draft encountered strong resistance from businesses and industry groups because of the breadth of its regulatory scope (Chohan 2022). It also triggered substantial public opposition: on JOIN[2], 38,795 users expressed opposition, compared to only 163 in support. In particular, provisions that would allow the removal of information or restriction of access generated serious concerns regarding freedom of expression. As a result, in early September 2022, the NCC suspended the legislative process and returned the draft to a working group for further review. In effect, Taiwan's attempt to introduce a comprehensive platform regulation law came to a halt.

[2] Public consultation on the Draft Act on Digital Intermediary Services, National Communications Commission (NCC), Taiwan, June 29–August 29, 2022. https://join.gov.tw/policies/detail/43dbdcc4-af21-4fcb-9173-d3b5993ab88d.

3.3. The Shift to Bargaining Act

Following the failure of comprehensive regulation, debate in Taiwan has increasingly shifted toward institutionalizing compensation for the use of news content. According to the Taipei Times (Shan 2025) and United Daily News (Li and Tang 2025), in 2025 the Legislative Yuan began deliberating a proposed News Media and Digital Platform Bargaining Draft Act that would require major digital platforms to negotiate with news organizations over the benefits generated by the use of news content (Lin et al. 2025). At the June 2025 public hearing on media bargaining legislation, it was confirmed that the KMT, DPP, andTPP had each submitted their own draft bills. MODA, however, adopted a cautious position, noting that such legislation could be interpreted by the United States as a trade barrier. At the same time, China Times reported that Zhuge Jun as arguing that the scope of the proposed bargaining framework should extend beyond Google and Meta to include generative AI companies as well (Zhuge 2025). Economic Daily News further reported that, as of March 2026, the government was still considering how to incorporate generative AI firms' use of news content into a broader framework of licensing, compensation, and revenue-sharing arrangements (Yu 2026).



Part 8
Education

AI education has emerged as a key policy domain, but approaches differ across countries. Japan is promoting the use of AI in education while emphasizing literacy, critical evaluation, and responsible use, although institutional frameworks, particularly in formal education, remain under development. South Korea is advancing the digital transformation of education and places strong emphasis on inclusivity in AI education. Taiwan is institutionalizing AI education through active collaboration with civil society, integrating it into broader efforts to strengthen digital citizenship and the information environment.

1. Japan

1.1. AI in Education

AI literacy and education are positioned as key components of Japan's response to AI-related societal risks. The National AI Basic Plan in 2025 (Cabinet Office 2025) emphasizes improving information utilization skills in primary and secondary education and supporting all citizens in developing AI literacy through demonstration projects and educational initiatives.

In primary and secondary education, policy orientation is generally supportive of AI use. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology issued provisional guidelines (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 2024) on the use of generative AI in education in July 2023 and released a revised version in December 2024. The guidelines describe generative AI as a potentially useful tool and stress that outputs should be treated as reference material, with final judgment and responsibility remaining with human users after considering associated risks. Based on these guidelines, pilot projects [1] promoting the use of generative AI have been implemented since 2023, and reports were submitted by dozens of junior and senior high schools in 2024. Some schools introduced practices such as fact-checking AI-generated outputs.

Across educational stages, from primary to higher education, policy documents emphasize learning both about AI and through AI, including understanding human-centered design, recognizing errors and biases in outputs, and assessing how information influences users' judgment and behavior.

Educational policy discussions also link AI literacy to democratic participation. In the review of the next national curriculum guidelines from 2030 (MEXT 2026), the discussion highlighted the need to foster individuals capable of participating in society in the digital age, taking into account the potential for social division caused by social media and generative AI. Current curricula are considered insufficient in addressing media literacy, particularly in terms of critically evaluating information, understanding its social and cultural context, and participating in digital society (MEXT 2026). Proposals have therefore been made to clarify and strengthen these elements as part of broader information technology education. Across educational stages, from primary to higher education, policy documents emphasize learning both about AI and through AI, including understanding human-centered design, recognizing errors and biases in outputs, and assessing how information influences users' judgment and behavior.

[1] "Leading DX School Generative AI Pilot School | Leading DX School" (In Japanese). https://leadingdxschool.mext.go.jp/ai_school/.

1.2. Literacy for the General Population

Efforts also target broader age groups. Government roadmaps for improving ICT literacy highlight the need to organize knowledge on generative AI, identify priority competencies, and develop and disseminate educational content (MIC 2023). Public educational materials provide introductory guidance on the use of generative AI, including explanations of risks related to information accuracy, data leakage, intellectual property, and user responsibility[2]. Awareness-raising content also frames AI as both a source of social risk, such as the spread of disinformation, and a tool for problem-solving (Boston Consulting Group 2025). Public–private collaboration has expanded, including DIGITAL POSITIVE ACTION, launched in 2025 to improve digital literacy through cooperation among platform companies, telecommunications operators, IT firms, and related organizations[3].

A 2023 survey comparing Japan, Korea, and the United States found that Japanese respondents were less likely to verify primary sources or check the timing of information, and awareness of key concepts related to the attention economy was significantly lower (Yomiuri Shimbun 2024).

However, implementations are ongoing. A government survey in 2025 found that while 87.8% of respondents considered ICT literacy important, 75.3% reported having undertaken little or no concrete action to improve it (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2025a). Comparative data also suggest weaker initial conditions in Japan. A 2023 survey comparing Japan, Korea, and the United States found that Japanese respondents were less likely to verify primary sources or check the timing of information, and awareness of key concepts related to the attention economy was significantly lower (Yomiuri Shimbun 2024).

At the same time, social conditions are rapidly changing. A 2025 survey showed that awareness and use of generative AI among elementary school students had increased substantially since 2023 (Benesse Corporation 2025). Many users reported relying on AI when they did not understand something and had experience

[2] Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), Japan. "First Steps with Generative AI: Introductory Usage and Precautions." *Safe and Secure Internet Use Guide*. https://www.soumu.go.jp/use_the_internet_wisely/special/generativeai/index.html.

[3] Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), Japan. "DIGITAL POSITIVE ACTION: Creating a Safe Digital Space for Everyone." https://www.soumu.go.jp/dpa/about/.

encountering errors in AI outputs. These trends indicate growing exposure to AI at early ages and suggest the increasing importance of systematic literacy development.

1.3. Cyber/AI Capacity-Building

In terms of education for developing cybersecurity talent, initiatives include the Cyber Defense Exercise with Recurrence (CYDER)[4] for Japanese government agencies, local governments, and critical infrastructure operators; the Security+Hackathon 365 Days (SecHack365)[5] and Security Camp[6] for fostering young security innovators; the opening of the cybersecurity exercise platform CYDERANGE to the private sector as an Open Platform (CYROP, NICT 2022); and cybersecurity capacity-building support for ASEAN countries (ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre: AJCCBC)[7]. Each of these initiatives has already produced hundreds of graduates, and the next challenge is finding ways to retain these talents in the AI and cybersecurity fields.

2. South Korea

2.1. Digital Transformation and AI

South Korea is promoting digital education transformation through the "High-Touch High-Tech" model (Ministry of Education 2023). AI handles personalized knowledge delivery, allowing teachers to serve as learning designers who prioritize critical thinking and emotional mentorship. This approach is reflected in the private sector. Platforms like Seoltab utilize AI (Jang 2024) to create personalized learning plans and designs centered on the student's questioning process through non-face-to-face formats. However, this transition has faced social friction regarding the role of educators. A notable controversy involving Gyeonggi Province's "Hi-Learning"

[4] National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), Japan. "CYDER: Practical Cyber Defense Exercise." National Cyber Training Center. https://cyder.nict.go.jp/.

[5] National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), Japan. "SecHack365: Long-Term Hackathon Program for Security Innovators." https://sechack365.nict.go.jp/.

[6] Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), Japan. "Security Camp: Advanced Security Education Program for Students." https://www.ipa.go.jp/jinzai/security-camp/index.html.

[7] ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre (AJCCBC). "About Us." Managed by the National Cyber Security Agency (NCSA) of Thailand and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). https://ajccbc.ncsa.or.th/.

platform, where promotional material depicted AI as superior to teachers and described their words as empty, sparked a significant backlash from teachers' unions, eventually leading to a public apology (Jin 2025).

2.2. Universal AI Literacy and Inclusiveness

Through the "AI for All" initiative (Ministry of Education 2025), Korea ensures that all citizens, from youth to seniors, can acquire AI as a basic civic literacy. To centralize these efforts, the Ministry of Education established the "AI Talent Support Bureau" (Ministry of Education 2025) in late 2025 to oversee the whole lifetime AI competency across all educational stages. This national framework is localized through targeted welfare projects. Busan provides AI-based smart learning and emotional support for vulnerable children (Smart City Korea 2022). Similarly, initiatives such as "Digital Competency Centers"[8] are expanding to offer digital literacy programs, and recently especially encompassing AI literacy. In parallel, public-led initiatives such as "Seoul AI Edutech,"[9] operated by the Seoul AI Foundation, are intensifying their focus on bridging the digital divide for the elderly and marginalized groups. By tailoring technology to specific vulnerable demographics, Korea is working to bridge the digital divide across all generations.

By tailoring technology to specific vulnerable demographics, Korea is working to bridge the digital divide across all generations.

With Korea's private tutoring market surging to nearly 30 trillion won (Ministry of Education and Statistics Korea 2025) and high-income households spending five times more than those at the bottom (Lee 2023), AI risks becoming a premium advantage that well-resourced families enjoy first, potentially widening the gap it aims to close. Yet, the same technology holds genuine promise as an equalizer. If deployed with serious infrastructure investment, personalized AI tools could be the most effective way to deliver quality education to students in rural and underserved areas. Ultimately, whether AI becomes a structural barrier or a ladder for social mobility will depend entirely on how boldly Korea addresses the

[8] National Information Society Agency (NIA), Republic of Korea. "AI Digital Learning Center (in Korean)." https://www.디지털배움터.kr/entry.do.

[9] Seoul AI Foundation. "Seoul AI EduTech: Digital Education Platform for Seoul Citizens." https://sdfedu.seoul.kr/main/index.jsp.

underlying inequalities of its educational landscape.

3. Taiwan

3.1. National Strategy and the Positioning of AI Education

In Taiwan's AI New Ten Major Infrastructure Projects Plan (National Development Council 2026), the section on "Digital Foundations" states that AI education should begin in elementary and junior high school, continue in senior high school, expand into interdisciplinary learning in universities and technical colleges, support the cultivation of industry-ready talent, and improve AI literacy and usage capacity among the wider public. Thus, in Taiwan, AI education is framed not simply as part of schooling, but as a broader talent ecosystem linked to industrial competitiveness and societal capacity-building.

3.2. School Education

The Ministry of Education has introduced age-specific materials for the generative AI era (Department of Information and Technology Education 2026). Learning with AI encourages upper elementary students to use generative AI as a learning aid through questioning, revision, and self-evaluation (Ministry of Education 2025), while Harnessing AI, Seeing the Future: A Required Course for Digital Citizens helps secondary students develop responsible digital citizenship through topics such as information verification, media literacy, intellectual property, privacy, and safety (Ministry of Education 2025). These efforts are reinforced by the Curriculum Guidelines of 12-Year Basic Education (National Academy for Educational Research 2018), which embed AI-era competencies in formal education: junior high students learn computational thinking and problem-solving through programming, data, and networks, together with digital ethics and security, while senior high students are introduced to big data, data mining, and machine learning.

Thus, in Taiwan, AI education is framed not simply as part of schooling, but as a broader talent ecosystem linked to industrial competitiveness and societal capacity-building.

In addition, Taiwan emphasizes digital competence as well as digital literacy. Audrey Tang emphasizes that learners should be not only receivers of information but also producers of knowledge, highlighting source verification and fact-checking as practical skills[10]. In this view, digital education is not merely technical training but a reciprocal form of learning in which students engage with society and contribute knowledge back to it. A related initiative is the T Ambassador Training Program, a practice-based scheme for university and junior college students and other eligible young people (Small and Medium Enterprise Administration 2020). It combines online coursework and hands-on training, while supporting the digital transformation of small and micro enterprises, and provides stipends and certificates to participants.

3.3. Civil Society Initiatives in Schools and Communities

In this view, digital education is not merely technical training but a reciprocal form of learning in which students engage with society and contribute knowledge back to it.

In Taiwan, AI and information literacy education extends beyond formal schooling and is also pursued through collaboration with civil society. For example, TFC[11] has also advanced information literacy beyond formal schooling by linking media education with digital inclusion. Its initiatives include workshops in schools and local communities (Ho 2022) on fact-checking tools and verification practices, as well as training mobile-phone instructors who support older adults (Wu 2022). The IORG[12] has translated research-based approaches to information literacy into practice through cooperation with educators and civic actors. Its activities include teacher training, student lectures, teacher–student co-creation workshops, and collaboration with community workers, including those in outlying island regions. It has also published A Guide to Information Literacy, a practical resource designed for educational use (IORG 2022).

[10] TBS CROSS DIG with Bloomberg. "Audrey Tang's Ally Microsoft Economist Glen Weyl: Beyond Majority Rule — Democracy in Japan and Taiwan, and How 'Conflict' Drives Innovation (In Japanese)." CROSSDIG 1on1. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gTWqbdfTc2g.

[11] Taiwan FactCheck Center (TFC). https://en.tfc-taiwan.org.tw/.

[12] Taiwan Information Environment Research Center (IORG). "About IORG." https://iorg.tw/_ua/about.

Taken together, these initiatives suggest that information literacy in Taiwan is being developed through a layered and socially embedded ecosystem that extends across schools, communities, and civil society organizations.

3.4. Limits of Current Literacy Approaches

At the same time, some argue that the current scope of literacy education remains insufficient. In an interview, Chihhao Yu[13] of IORG emphasized that, beyond technical skills, it is crucial to cultivate the capacity to discuss politics with peers in ways that are informed, respectful, and resilient to manipulation. Tim Niven[14] of DoubleThink Lab and Summer Chen[15] of FactLink similarly emphasized that education should focus not only on debunking individual stories or claims, but also on helping citizens understand the recurring narratives, tropes, and the broader strategic playbook of PRC information manipulation. From this perspective, greater awareness of these broader structures would enable citizens to identify and interpret new, highly granular disinformation narratives more independently.

[13] Chihhao Yu, co-director of the Taiwan Information Environment Research Center (IORG). Profile at Global Taiwan Institute. https://globaltaiwan.org/member/chihhao-yu/.

[14] Tim Niven, PhD, Deputy CEO, Doublethink Lab. Google Scholar profile. https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=B9vqlpwAAAAJ&hl=en.

[15] Summer Chen, founder of FactLink; former chief editor of Taiwan FactCheck Center (2019–2024). Profile at Global Taiwan Institute. https://globaltaiwan.org/member/summer-chen/.



Part 9
Labor

Challenges derived from labor issues constitute a critical dimension of AI's democratic implications. Economic inequality driven by AI-induced job displacement can erode existing disparities, posing broader risks to the health of democratic societies. Simultaneously, the non-transparent use of AI in hiring decisions directly threatens core democratic values such as fairness, non-discrimination, and due process, while raising fundamental questions of algorithmic accountability that democratic governance must address. Two labor-related concerns emerge across countries: job displacement caused by automation and potential discrimination in AI-assisted hiring. Policy responses to job replacement differ. In addressing employment protection, Taiwan relies more on statutory provisions that guarantee worker protections, while South Korea seeks to address labor transitions through negotiations and union pressure. Japan frames AI primarily as a productivity tool and focuses on reskilling and labor mobility. AI-assisted recruitment is widely introduced across cases. At the same time, concerns exist regarding potential algorithmic discrimination, addressed largely through soft law.

1. Japan

1.1. Labor Transition and Countermeasures through Reskilling

In Japan, population decline and the resulting constraints on labor supply are widely recognized as urgent policy challenges. Within this context, AI is discussed not only as a source of labor risk but also as a tool for maintaining productivity. The AI Business Guidelines identify unemployment as a potential risk and emphasize human dignity, autonomy, and education and reskilling as guiding principles (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2025). An October 2025 report by AISI also refers to possible impacts on labor markets and economic inequality (Japan AI Safety Institute 2025). At the same time, METI's 2025 "2040 scenario" estimates that promoting AI and robotics, combined with reskilling, could help offset a projected shortfall of approximately 2 million workers (METI Industrial Structure Council 2025). The draft of the 12th Basic Plan for Vocational Ability Development in 2026 similarly notes that AI may reduce demand in certain occupations but stresses investment in "human capital" and skills development (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2025).

Within this context, AI is discussed not only as a source of labor risk but also as a tool for maintaining productivity.

At the firm level, early signs of labor substitution have appeared. For example, in November 2025, NTT, one of the largest telecommunications companies in Japan, stated that more than half of its operations could be handled by AI within five years (Nikkei 2025b). A Nikkei survey of over 100 major firms found that several companies expect AI to supplement 30–40 percent of internal tasks.

Policy responses focus primarily on reskilling and labor mobility. Vocational training policies have been expanded. These measures include direct financial support for individuals, indirect support through firms, and training programs delivered through private training providers. At the same time, several challenges have been pointed out, including a policy bias toward firm-mediated programs, barriers to self-directed learning, and unequal access for non-regular workers and younger employees (Nitta and Tanaka 2025). These support measures are not limited to AI-related skills and are intended to address broader changes in the labor market. The Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare has launched model projects to create practical training

environments for digital and AI skills[1]. In the private sector, the Japanese Electrical, Electronic, and Information Union has begun providing AI-related reskilling programs in cooperation with Microsoft across affiliated unions (Matsui 2026).

While large-scale unemployment has not yet materialized in Japan, concerns about inequality have been raised. In a March 2026 interview, Takahiro Anno, the leader of the opposition party, argued that AI may disproportionately affect higher-income white-collar workers and widen income gaps, calling for measures such as refundable tax credits and discussions of basic income or basic services (Bloomberg 2026). Some also note that policy discussions on AI strategy lack a perspective of workers (Nitta and Tanaka 2025). Although productivity enhancement is central to policy discourse, the broader social and democratic implications of occupational restructuring and income divergence remain only briefly addressed.

1.2. AI in Recruitment

AI is increasingly influencing recruitment practices. Although surveys report varying figures, many private companies have begun to use AI in hiring processes. While the use of AI in recruitment can improve efficiency, it also entails several risks. As highlighted in the AI Business Guidelines (MIC and METI 2025b), these include the possibility that biased training data may lead to discriminatory outputs, the risk of excessive reliance on AI in decision-making, and the potential for inappropriate use of personal data. The document calls for efforts to mitigate the bias and for intervention by human decisions (MIC and METI 2025a).

Although productivity enhancement is central to policy discourse, the broader social and democratic implications of occupational restructuring and income divergence remain only briefly addressed.

As the use of AI expands in the private sector, public employment support institutions have also begun to explore how AI might be utilized in their services (Employment Security Bureau 2025). Current policy directions emphasize that AI should not replace all human tasks but should instead be used as a tool to enhance the accessibility and efficiency of employment services. From 2026 onward, pilot

[1] Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), Japan. "Model Project for Developing Practical Opportunities for Digital Human Resource Development (In Japanese)." Commissioned operator: Pasona Co., Ltd. Project period: FY2023–FY2025. https://dx-jinzai.mhlw.go.jp/ (site no longer available; see also https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/koyou_roudou/jinzaikaihatsu/program_development_00019.html).

projects and system design initiatives are expected to advance toward implementation. Within these discussions, particular attention has been given to preventing the leakage of personal and confidential information and to mitigating the generation of inappropriate or biased outputs.

2. South Korea

2.1. Labor Transition Struggle

In February 2026, the Ministry of Employment and Labor and the two national trade union confederations—the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions—inaugurated high-level consultative bodies to address AI-driven industrial restructuring and job security through monthly policy dialogues (Ministry of Employment and Labor 2026). However, these discussions face immediate friction on the production floor. At Hyundai Motor, the union has strongly opposed the introduction of the Atlas humanoid robot, asserting that not a single unit can be deployed without a formal labor-management agreement (Park 2026). Furthermore, industry voices strong concern (Kang 2026) that the Yellow Envelope Law (Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act 2025) could further empower such opposition by bringing managerial decisions, including the adoption of AI and robotics, into the scope of collective bargaining[2]. This regulatory shift, from an industrial perspective, risks turning technological transitions into a prolonged cause of industrial deadlock.

[2] Republic of Korea. Framework Act on Artificial Intelligence Development and Establishment of Trust (in Korean), Act No. 21311 (enforced January 22, 2026). https://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsId=014820&ancYnChk=0#0000.

2.2. Algorithmic Justice in Labor Fields

Korea is pursuing algorithmic justice in the labor fields through Article 37 of the Personal Information Protection Act[3] and the AI Basic Act[4]. Furthermore, guidance from the Personal Information Protection Commission clarifies that AI-based hiring and dismissal decisions generally fall within the category of automated decisions that significantly affect rights (PIPC 2025). However, concerns persist regarding legal ambiguity and the significant capability gap between firms. Especially for small and medium-sized enterprises, which employ approximately 80% of the workforce, AI utilization stood at just 36% in 2025 (Park 2025), merely half the rate of large corporations, due to limited access to human resources and legal counsel. Simultaneously, conflicts between society and corporations regarding algorithmic transparency are becoming increasingly prominent. A representative conflict involves Baemin, Korea's largest food delivery platform, which has faced repeated calls for algorithmic transparency but maintains that such information constitutes trade secrets (Gye 2023).

Korea's AI labor transition is being built on a fractured foundation, unfolding in a market where generational inequality is reaching a breaking point.

Korea's AI labor transition is being built on a fractured foundation, unfolding in a market where generational inequality is reaching a breaking point. While high-level dialogues signal institutional awareness, they face a harsh reality. Youth employment is stalling despite record education levels, and the elderly, those already suffering from the OECD's highest poverty rate and accounting for approximately 70% of workers in jobs under 15 hours per week, see their already unstable roles threatened by AI and automation (Yu 2025). With SMEs employing over 80% of workers (Ministry of SMEs and Startups N.d.) but lacking the capacity to adapt, dialogue risks outpacing structural readiness. Ultimately, unless policies prioritize the most vulnerable segments, the AI transition may deepen existing social fractures.

[3] Republic of Korea. Personal Information Protection Act (in Korean), Act No. 19234 (partially amended March 14, 2023; enforced September 15, 2023), Article 37. https://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsId=014820&ancYnChk=0#0000.

[4] Republic of Korea. Framework Act on Artificial Intelligence Development and Establishment of Trust (in Korean), Act No. 21311 (enforced January 22, 2026). https://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsId=014820&ancYnChk=0#0000.

3. Taiwan

3.1. AI-Driven Job Displacement

Taiwan is increasingly confronting concerns over the implications of artificial intelligence for labor markets, workers' rights, and social protection. Public debate has intensified around the prospect of technological unemployment, particularly as automation is expected to replace repetitive and routine tasks more rapidly than other forms of work. These anxieties are reflected in a Taipei Times report suggesting that Taiwanese firms anticipate AI could displace nearly one-third of existing jobs over the coming decade (Taipei Times 2024). In response, Taiwan's emerging AI governance framework has begun to address labor-related risks.

These anxieties are reflected in a Taipei Times report suggesting that Taiwanese firms anticipate AI could displace nearly one-third of existing jobs over the coming decade (Taipei Times 2024).

Article 12 of the AI Basic Act stipulates that the government must protect workers' occupational safety, while also providing reemployment assistance to those who become unemployed as a result of AI adoption (Chien 2025). Beyond this general principle, the Workforce Development Agency under the Ministry of Labor (MOL) has introduced concrete policy measures to facilitate workforce adaptation (Workforce Development Agency 2024b). These include subsidized AI-related training for employed workers, youth-targeted vocational programs such as the Industrial Talents Program, and retraining initiatives that enable workers to receive financial support while undertaking online learning. At the same time, the Executive Yuan frames AI investment not merely as a source of regulatory and social challenges, but also as a key pillar of economic growth and job creation, as demonstrated by its promotion of the Ten Major AI Infrastructure Projects (Reuters 2025).

3.2. AI in Hiring and Algorithmic Discrimination

A 2024 survey conducted by MOL found that 3.0 percent of firms were already using AI interview tools in recruitment, while 34.3 percent were considering adopting them (Workforce Development Agency 2024a). Although such tools may help reduce recruitment costs, concerns remain that they may generate discriminatory outcomes in employment, even unintentionally. Article 4(6) of the

AI Basic Act stipulates that, throughout the research, development, and application of AI, algorithmic bias and discrimination should be avoided as far as possible, and that AI must not result in discriminatory outcomes against particular groups (Executive Yuan 2025).

March 2026 United Daily News (Ye 2026) and CNA (Zhang 2026) reports indicate that MOL is drafting Guidelines on the Introduction and Use of Artificial Intelligence by Business Entities, which could be issued as early as mid-2026. The reports suggest that the draft guidelines are centered on transparency, human oversight, labor-management consultation, and privacy protection, with particular attention to preventing unfair treatment or discrimination in recruitment, selection, performance evaluation, and dismissal. The United Daily News report further notes that, if AI is used in recruitment, employers would be expected to inform job applicants in advance and ensure that final decisions remain subject to human judgment; likewise, where AI is used in employee performance evaluation, employers would be expected to disclose the evaluation criteria in advance, retain human oversight in final decision-making, and be able to explain the evaluation results (Ye 2026). However, some experts contend that non-binding guidelines alone are insufficient, and that the government should undertake a comprehensive review of existing legal frameworks to assess whether statutory amendments are necessary (Zhang 2026).

However, some experts contend that non-binding guidelines alone are insufficient, and that the government should undertake a comprehensive review of existing legal frameworks to assess whether statutory amendments are necessary (Zhang 2026).



Part 10
Assistance for Developing Countries

As the evolution of AI can produce and amplify global inequality, foreign assistance to developing countries has become crucial to mitigate this effect. In this regard, East Asian democracies exhibit different levels and approaches. Japan stands out as the most active provider, focusing especially on governance support and capacity-building, framed in terms of human-centered and trustworthy AI. South Korea adopts a more explicitly value-driven approach, emphasizing inclusivity and democratic governance in its international initiatives. Taiwan engages less through large-scale assistance, but civil society actors play an active role in international collaboration through research, network-building, and capacity-building activities.

1. Japan

1.1. Active AI Cooperation with a Human-Centered Emphasis

Japan is actively assisting and collaborating with the Global South in AI. Japan has promoted the "co-creation of a safe, secure, and trustworthy AI ecosystem" as a key concept in its engagement with the Global South. Based on this approach, it has advanced AI-related cooperation with partners including India (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2026), ASEAN (MOFA, MIC, and METI 2025a), Central Asia (MOFA, MIC, and METI 2025b), and African countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2025). These initiatives focus on four pillars: problem-solving through the use of AI, institutional assistance, human resource development and capacity-building, and infrastructure support, including data centers and AI models for local languages. As the table indicates, the scope of cooperation varies across partner regions. Several initiatives have seen further developments to strengthen collaboration.

Table 12-1: Japan's international AI diplomacy with the Global South

Partner	AI Solution	Governance	Capacity	Infrastructure
India	○	○	○	○
ASEAN	○	○	○	○
Central Asia	○	○	○	
Africa		○	○	

The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has incorporated a human-centered AI approach into its development assistance[1]. JICA programs aim to improve public services through AI while acknowledging potential risks such as digital divides and algorithmic discrimination. Current initiatives include support for national AI strategy formulation, AI literacy programs, and pilot projects that implement AI applications in sectors such as education, health, and public administration.

[1] Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). "AI Cooperation: JICA's Six Pillars of DX (In Japanese)." https://www.jica.go.jp/about/dx/six_pillars/pillar_3/.

These cooperation efforts are also linked to Japan's broader international AI governance agenda. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs positions the Hiroshima AI Process as a component of governance assistance in cooperation with partner countries. Japan has also promoted exchanges between the OECD and Southeast Asian countries by means of workshops on AI governance tools at the Japanese embassy in Bangkok (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2025a).

At the same time, cooperation with the Global South often frames AI governance in terms of human-centeredness and safe, secure, and trustworthy AI, a formulation that places less explicit emphasis on democracy and human rights than multilateral discussions such as the Hiroshima AI Process, where democratic values are explicitly mentioned.

2. South Korea

2.1. The Global AI Basic Society

Korea is championing the "AI Basic Society" as a new global standard, ensuring that technological benefits are redistributed to bridge the digital divide (Office of the President 2025). At the 2025 Gyeongju APEC Summit, Korea led the "APEC AI Initiative," the first ministerial consensus signed by both the U.S. and China (Korea Policy Briefing 2025). This initiative serves as the global blueprint for an inclusive AI society, focusing on shared growth and equitable access across the Asia-Pacific. By positioning AI as a public good, Korea is attempting the transition from a competitive innovation race to a collaborative, value-driven global governance model.

2.2. K-Democracy ODA

Centered on the AI Democracy Subcommittee established in 2026, Korea is endeavoring to extend its "K-Democracy ODA" to share its unique expertise in institutionalizing digital democracy. By exporting platforms that integrate cutting-edge technology with democratic values, Korea tries to solidify its normative leadership within the global AI governance architecture. Complementing this value-based approach, Korean enterprises are also gaining experience in supporting other nations to build their own sovereign AI. A representative example is the export and

co-development of LLM platforms and infrastructure in Thailand, demonstrating Korea's capacity to help states secure sovereignty through localized AI development.

Korea's effort to treat AI as a public good through the "AI Basic Society" vision has successfully evolved from a domestic concept into a global agenda, marked by the significant diplomatic achievement of securing both U.S. and Chinese support at APEC. This normative ambition is further reinforced by "K-Democracy ODA," which distinguishes Korea on the global stage by sharing its practical experience in building civic platforms, supporting digital sovereignty, and promoting AI literacy rather than merely exporting technology. While this proactive international engagement represents one of the strongest chapters in Korea's global AI strategy, its long-term credibility remains intrinsically linked to domestic performance. Ultimately, the real test for Korea will be whether it can resolve its own internal policy tensions effectively enough to ensure that its domestic practices live up to the value-driven model it seeks to champion abroad.

3. Taiwan

Given Taiwan's distinct international position, international engagement in this area has often relied less on formal state-led outreach than on the transnational activities of civil society organizations.

In this context, Doublethink Lab[2] provides a particularly relevant example in the field of AI and digital governance. Founded in Taiwan in 2019, it is a civil society research organization that examines Chinese digital influence operations, disinformation, and the transnational diffusion of digital authoritarian practices. Its relevance to AI and digital governance is reflected in its work on AI-enabled disinformation and surveillance, as well as in the practical investigative methods it has developed to detect and analyze such threats. Its activities extend beyond Taiwan through research, election observation, and capacity-building initiatives in countries considered vulnerable to information manipulation. During India's 2024 general election, for example, it coordinated an election observation effort (Yu 2024), while in the Philippines it has provided training for journalists since 2023 using OSINT-based investigative methods and analytical frameworks (Doublethink Lab 2024). It

[2] Doublethink Lab. "Strengthen Democracy Through Enhancing Digital Defenses." https://doublethinklab.org/.

has also examined Thailand as a case in which Chinese CCTV systems and AI-enabled facial recognition technologies may have been used in political repression (Lee 2025). As Tim Niven[3] noted in an interview, the organization is also exploring initiatives in countries including Zambia, Nigeria, and Malaysia, while deepening cooperation with partners in New Zealand and South Korea.

More broadly, the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy plays a complementary role in sustaining the transnational networks and normative dialogue that underpin more issue-specific cooperation (Taiwan Foundation for Democracy 2025). Established in 2003, it is a quasi-public democracy-assistance foundation with public support and a cross-party institutional basis. In recent years, it has also begun to engage with issues at the intersection of AI and democracy. One example is its international forum on local democracy (TECRO in Japan 2026), held in January 2026 under the theme "AI × Democracy." Moderated by Audrey Tang, the event brought together 12 participants from six countries.

[3] Tim Niven, PhD, Deputy CEO, Doublethink Lab. Google Scholar profile. https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=B9vqlpwAAAAJ&hl=en.



Part 11
Gaps Existing Initiatives and Way Forward

We have thus far outlined the initiatives being undertaken by each country. What this paper aims to clarify next is what has not been done and what must be done in the future.

Although the intensity varies by country and time period, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have all placed a high priority on reconciling AI governance with values such as the rule of law, human rights, diversity, equity, democracy, inclusivity, non-discrimination, transparency, and accountability. However, fundamentally, these three countries are in a position where they are striving to catch up with AI-leading countries like the United States and China, and they are implementing policies that also prioritize the promotion of innovation in the AI field.

In terms of international principle and norm formation, most notable is the Hiroshima AI Process, established in 2023, along with its International Guidelines and International Code of Conduct. These are positioned to apply not only to those who develop AI but also to those who use it. However, most

Efforts to strengthen democratic governance through the use of digital tools are not yet being implemented nationwide in Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan; rather, they remain at the experimental or localized stage.

of the content of the guidelines and code is formulated with developers in mind. Furthermore, while stating that values such as democracy must not be compromised during use, these documents do not provide guidance on how to safeguard democratic values in cases where the design of AI systems or the manner of their use could easily undermine democratic values within the societies of the user countries.

Furthermore, the values essential to upholding liberal democracy—such as the rule of law, human rights, due process, diversity, equity, and democracy—which were highlighted as norms in the Hiroshima AI Process, have not been consistently endorsed in subsequent international initiatives observed in East Asia. The fact that the 2024 Seoul AI Business Pledge barely touches upon these values is a case in point. This is due not only to differing priorities among countries and actors but also to the non-binding nature of the guidelines.

Efforts to strengthen democratic governance through the use of digital tools are not yet being implemented nationwide in Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan; rather, they remain at the experimental or localized stage. These initiatives are based on the principle of participatory democracy, which seeks to broadly incorporate domestic public opinion. However, given that public opinion itself is increasingly influenced by AI—which has been shaped by non-democratic actors through LLM grooming—or is taking on more undemocratic and discriminatory tones due to the rise of populism, it is difficult to say that measures to safeguard democratic values and institutions without being swayed by these trends have been incorporated at this stage. Furthermore, digital democracy initiatives do not extend beyond national borders. That said, Taiwan's digital democracy initiatives appear to be more advanced than those of Japan and South Korea. In particular, the role of the civic tech community is integrated, and it is expected to play a role not only in collaborating with the government but also in monitoring it.

Awareness is growing in every country regarding the spread of AI-generated misinformation, malicious content, fake images, and fake videos, and efforts are underway to address the significant impact this has on the integrity of information. Differences in the situation can be observed across countries: Japan tends to prioritize freedom of expression and relies heavily on platform self-regulation; in South Korea, fact-checking organizations are caught up in societal polarization; and in Taiwan, the anti-China factor politicizes its counter-FIMI approaches.

However, in all cases, efforts to counter information manipulation through disinformation and malinformation—which have significantly increased in speed and volume due to AI, accelerated by the fragility of the international society—are unlikely to be sufficient to address the problem, especially as this trend is expected to accelerate further. The barriers to addressing this issue have become even higher, partly because major U.S. tech giants significantly reduced their funding for counter-disinformation efforts starting in 2025. Furthermore, the fundamental problem remains that we have not been able to regulate the attention economy model of platforms themselves, which inherently provides incentives to mass-distribute political videos and images. Unless this issue is resolved, it will be difficult to curb the politics of emotion.

However, in all cases, efforts to counter information manipulation through disinformation and malinformation—which have significantly increased in speed and volume due to AI, accelerated by the fragility of the international society—are unlikely to be sufficient to address the problem, especially as this trend is expected to accelerate further.

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—countries facing serious cyber threats—are implementing multi-layered initiatives that address both "Security for AI" (defending against cyberattacks targeting AI) and "AI for Security" (preventing cyberattacks that exploit AI). They are also engaged in capacity-building efforts for developing countries across Asia. While cybersecurity is crucial for the stability of democratic societies—as evidenced by examples of election interference using "hack and leak" tactics in the United

States and elsewhere—efforts in this area are inevitably dominated by security and financial considerations.

However, none of these three countries currently host major AI companies, and they are still in the early stages of preparing to build sovereign AI systems.

Ensuring the security of information regarding democratic societies and pro-democracy actors—such as data theft by authoritarian states and the collection of foreign data by Chinese companies, to which the Chinese government then gains access—is a critical issue. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are all actively working on data protection, but the focus is often on protecting data from their own governments and companies, and measures such as imposing fines are being implemented.

The "sovereign AI" initiative, which aims to build each country's own AI system, seeks to independently develop AI infrastructure capable of aggregating information, analyzing it, and formulating countermeasures without relying on AI from other countries. These measures were devised with the understanding that it is necessary to promote AI-driven innovation and establish governance frameworks while protecting data from foreign governments. However, none of these three countries currently host major AI companies, and they are still in the early stages of preparing to build sovereign AI systems. All of these initiatives began in 2025, and they have not yet reached the stage of providing support to other countries in this field.

When AI indiscriminately ingests large amounts of information and uses it for output, information whose accuracy is not necessarily guaranteed can spread rapidly. In contrast, actors essential to the foundation of a democratic society—such as media outlets that verify information to disseminate accurate content—may suffer a loss of commercial revenue and become unsustainable if their content is accessed for free. For this reason, copyright protection is crucial for democratic societies.

Amid the conflict between the content industry and the tech industry, countries are struggling to determine appropriate regulatory frameworks and have not yet reached the stage of providing support to other countries in this

area. Since these three countries do not own major AI companies, their discussions focus not only on how to protect their domestic content industries from foreign AI companies but also on how to safeguard content creation while enabling the training of domestic AI companies. These discussions themselves could serve as a reference point for other countries.

However, support for developing countries is primarily directed at government agencies; there is no capacity-building support for citizens seeking to protect themselves from surveillance or oppression by their own government, major tech companies, or foreign governments.

In an era where AI is accelerating the spread of misinformation, AI literacy education is crucial for maintaining the resilience of democratic societies. All three countries examined incorporate AI and media literacy education into their primary and secondary school curricula. Additionally, they are implementing training programs to prevent social division and build capacity in the fields of AI and cybersecurity. Support for developing countries in this area is also active. However, support for developing countries is primarily directed at government agencies; there is no capacity-building support for citizens seeking to protect themselves from surveillance or oppression by their own government, major tech companies, or foreign governments. Constructive criticism from Taiwan's civil society also highlights the lack and importance of digital civic education to safeguard civic space.

Issues such as the replacement of human labor by AI and wage disparities stemming from access to AI are problems that could widen economic inequality and destabilize democratic societies. Consequently, measures are being taken to mitigate these impacts, such as promoting recurrent education in the field of AI. However, forecasts regarding the extent to which the labor market will be affected by AI, as well as the scope of recurrent education, are limited to domestic contexts; analyses do not include the impact on labor markets in other countries. While providing the content of recurring education currently offered in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to developing countries is one option, it is also necessary to raise awareness within

developed nations regarding how their AI technologies are affecting the labor markets of developing countries, and to advance analyses of the impact this has on democracy in those nations and the international community, along with corresponding countermeasures.

However, the absence of third-party oversight bodies to monitor the AI algorithms used for anti-corruption efforts leaves room for such measures to be exploited for political purposes.

From the perspective of supporting developing countries, Japan's focus is overly skewed toward providing aid to governments, and the lack of necessary support for non-governmental actors to safeguard democracy is a significant issue. Given that many developing countries have recently adopted China's surveillance systems, aid from countries like Japan and South Korea must not serve to strengthen or complement these surveillance capabilities; instead, it must support the capacity to counter them. Furthermore, in recent years, an increasing number of countries, such as Thailand, have been digitizing administrative data and using AI to flag potential corruption. However, the absence of third-party oversight bodies to monitor the AI algorithms used for anti-corruption efforts leaves room for such measures to be exploited for political purposes.

By contrast, Taiwan's civil society organizations have established cross-border partnerships and are enhancing the capabilities of civil society groups worldwide through joint research and capacity-building. That said, there are limits to relying solely on a handful of organizations like Double Think Lab to carry out these activities, and Double Think Lab's capacity-building support is not funded entirely by its own resources. Support for civil society—including funding from Asian organizations—is essential.

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—all of which seek to safeguard democratic values and institutions while advancing the goals of enhancing AI capabilities and fostering innovation—are undertaking numerous initiatives. However, several common issues are evident. First, these efforts largely remain domestic, providing little support to strengthen the democratic values and institutions of other countries in relation to AI. Second, insufficient efforts are

being made to establish international norms for protecting democracy from and with AI. Third, due to the absence of an international perspective, the potential for authoritarian governments to use AI for data theft, strengthening surveillance systems, and exploiting seemingly democratic actions, such as anti-corruption measures, for political gain is not fully recognized or included in the scope of countermeasures. Fourth, despite the weakening of democracy in other countries, support for civil society is inadequate, despite its essential role in such contexts.

In the Asian region, where multiple major authoritarian countries exist whose influence extends across borders, it is necessary to expand such support and undertake initiatives that protect democracy from and with AI.

This shows the necessity of launching initiatives with multiple elements. First, the focus should be on transborder aspects to support developing countries suffering from the unavoidable impact of AI from developed countries. Second, support must be provided to civil society actors, who are absent from existing initiatives in East Asian countries. Third, these initiatives should prioritize the protection of democratic norms and values over technological advancement. Fourth, these initiatives will likely require the involvement of civil society actors from developed countries who are well-versed in both democracy and AI.

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are perfectly suited to embark on such an endeavor. Japan is eager to set global norms, South Korea is adept at launching tech-based initiatives quickly, and Taiwan has rich human resources and experience in the civil society sector. A coalition of actors from these three countries is well suited to support democracy from and with AI.

Traditionally, democracy support has kept its distance from fields such as AI, digital technology, cybersecurity, and data. In the Asian region, where multiple major authoritarian countries exist whose influence extends across borders, it is necessary to expand such support and undertake initiatives that protect democracy from and with AI.

References

Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission. 2026. "AI Meets the People's Petition: The 'AI Citizen Rights Platform' Emerges (In Korean)." *Korea Policy Briefing*. February 20. https://www.korea.kr/multi/visualNewsView.do?newsId=148959732.

Anti-Infiltration Act. Promulgated January 15, 2020. https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0030317.

Artificial Intelligence Basic Act. Promulgated January 14, 2026. https://law.nstc.gov.tw/LawContent.aspx?id=GL000592.

Asahi Shimbun. 2024. "[Now Asking] Iida Yoichi, Special Negotiator at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications: What Is the Essence of International Negotiations on AI Rules — With Correction and Apology (In Japanese)." August 24. https://www.asahi.com/articles/DA3S16018040.html.

Baek, Ji-yeon. 2025. "Tasks for Resolving AI Data Training and Copyright Issues (In Korean)." *Issues and Analysis*, No. 2427. National Assembly Research Service. November 13. https://www.nars.go.kr/report/view.do?cmsCode=CM0018&brdSeq=48419.

Bang, Eun-ju. 2025. "Korea Cyber Security Alliance Launched... 'Contributing to Making Korea a Cyber Powerhouse' (In Korean)." *ZDNet Korea*. November 7. https://zdnet.co.kr/view/?no=20251107203030.

Benesse Corporation. 2025. "Survey on Awareness of Generative AI Usage: Elementary School Students' Awareness of 'Generative AI' Reaches 74.7%, Up Approximately 26 Points Since 2023 (In Japanese)." Press release. November 21. https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000001417.000000120.html.

Beopryul Shinmun. 2021. "Significance and Implications of the Personal Information Protection Commission's Decision on the 'Iruda' Case (In Korean)." May 14. https://www.lawnb.com/Info/ContentView?sid=N00088A4059A3C78.

Bloomberg. 2026. "AI May Swell Japan's Lower-Income Ranks, Party Leader Warns." March 2. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-02/ai-may-swell-japan-s-lower-income-ranks-party-leader-warns.

Boston Consulting Group (BCG). 2025. "Development and Utilization of Awareness-Raising Content Based on the Characteristics of Age Groups That Require Priority Improvement in ICT Literacy (In Japanese)." Report commissioned by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. March 31. https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/001003519.pdf.

Cabinet Office and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan. 2026. "Secretariat Briefing Materials for the 1st AI and Semiconductor Working Group Meeting (In Japanese)." February 12. https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/mono_info_service/joho/conference/seichosenryakuwg/aisemicon01/shiryo04.pdf.

Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 2025. "Outline of the Act on Promotion of Research and Development, and Utilization of AI-related Technology (AI Act)." https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/ai/ai_hou_gaiyou_en.pdf.

Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 2026. "Artificial Intelligence Basic Plan: 'Japan Rebooted' through 'Trustworthy AI'." January 16. https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/ai/ai_plan/aiplan_eng_20260116.pdf.

Cabinet Office, Government Japan. 2025. "Basic Plan for Artificial Intelligence: Japan's Revival through 'Trustworthy AI' (In Japanese)." December 23. https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/ai/ai_plan/aiplan_20251223.pdf.

Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan. 2022. "National Security Strategy of Japan." December. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf.

Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan. 2024. "Recommendations for Improving Response Capabilities in the Field of Cyber Security (In Japanese)." November 29. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/cyber_anzen_hosyo/koujou_teigen/teigen.pdf.

Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan. 2025. "Key Points of the Study Meeting on Amendments to the Economic Security Promotion Act (In Japanese)." December 16. Document 1, 13th Meeting. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/keizai_anzen_hosyohousei/r7_dai13/shiryo1.pdf.

Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan. N.d.a "Initiatives on Cyber Security (In Japanese)." https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/cyber_anzen_hosyo_torikumi/index.html.

Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan. N.d.b "Japan Growth Strategy Headquarters / Japan Growth Strategy Council (In Japanese)." https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/nipponseichosenryaku/index.html .

Chang, Robin and Eddie Hsiung. 2025. "Digital Business Laws and Regulations: Taiwan." In *ICLG: Digital Business Laws and Regulations Report 2025-2026*, ed. Global Legal Group. London: Global Legal Group. https://iclg.com/practice-areas/digital-business-laws-and-regulations/taiwan.

Chen, Wei-nong. 2026. "Learning from Australia and Canada: Is Taiwan's 'Dual-Track of Bargaining and Fund' Approach a Solution for Platform Governance? (In Chinese)." *FEJA Newsletter*. March 11. https://feja.org.tw/81514/.

Chien, Hsiu-Ru. 2025. "Draft of AI Basic Act Released: Regulating Development and Application." *Lee and Li Newsletter*. September 26. https://www.leeandli.com/EN/Newsletters/7507.htm.

Chiu, Chiao-chen and Jake Chung. 2025. "Chinese Apps Are Security Risk, Ministry Warns." *Taipei Times*. December 4. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/12/04/2003848298.

Chohan, Ameet. 2022. "Access Alert: Taiwan Releases Digital Intermediary Services Act." *Access Partnership*. July 15. https://accesspartnership.com/opinion/access-alert-taiwan-releases-digital-intermediary-services-act/.

Choi, Hye-rim. 2025. "'Demand Consent for Billions of Records?'...Korean-Style Personal Data Regulations Hindering AI Learning Under Scrutiny (In Korean)." *Financial News*. November 26. https://n.news.naver.com/mnews/article/014/0005440456.

Choi, Seung-young. 2025. "Terrestrial Broadcasters vs. Naver 'AI Lawsuit'... Court: 'Specific Copyright Infringement Cases Must Be Identified' (In Korean)." *Korea Journalists Association Report*. November 10. https://www.journalist.or.kr/news/article.html?no=59634.

Chung, Jake. 2025. "Chinese Hacker Targeting Hospital Identified: Police." *Taipei Times*. April 3. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2025/04/03/2003834526.

Civil Society Organizations. 2021. "Civil Society Declaration Calling for AI Policies That Guarantee Human Rights, Safety, and Democracy (In Korean)." May 25. https://culturalaction.org/39/?bmode=view&idx=6760212.

Committee on New Direction of Economic and Industrial Policies, Industrial Structure Council, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan. 2025. *Fourth Report of the Committee on New Direction of Economic and Industrial Policies: Industrial Structure in 2040 Led by Growth Investment*. June 3. https://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/sankoshin/shin_kijiku/pdf/20250603_5.pdf.

Cyber Security Management Act. Amended September 24, 2025. https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0030297.

Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters, Japan. 2025. "Cybersecurity Strategy (In Japanese)." December 23. https://www.cyber.go.jp/pdf/policy/kihon-s/cs_strategy2025.pdf.

Department of Information and Technology Education, Ministry of Education, Taiwan. 2026. "From Curiosity to Critical Thinking: Ministry of Education Creates AI Co-Learning Guides for Children (In Chinese)." January 29. https://dept.moe.gov.tw/ED2700/News_Content.aspx?n=727087A8A1328DEE&s=785274C9C54578B3.

Disaster Prevention and Protection Act. Amended May 28, 2025. Article 53. https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=D0120014.

Doublethink Lab. 2024. "Capacitating Filipino Journalists against FIMI." *Doublethink Lab*. June 18. https://medium.com/doublethinklab/capacitating-filipino-journalists-against-fimi-3aa52b0b6100.

Employment Security Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), Japan. 2025. "On the Utilization of AI in Hello Work with a View to the Future (In Japanese)." April 22. https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11601100/001478507.pdf.

Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan). 2018. "Implementation Guidelines for Public Policy Online Participation (In Chinese)." Order No. Yuan-Shou-Fa-Tzu No. 1071500579B, originally promulgated July 17, 2015, amended April 11, 2018. https://theme.ndc.gov.tw/lawout/LawContent.aspx?id=GL000215.

Executive Yuan, Taiwan. 2025. "Minutes of the 3967th Executive Yuan Meeting: Agenda Item 3 — Draft Artificial Intelligence Basic Act (In Chinese)." August 28. https://www.ey.gov.tw/File/E3D2460979E0685?A=C.

FactLink. 2025. "Taiwan's First Newsroom AI-Generated Fake Image Verification Guide Released (In Chinese)." December 16. https://www.factlink.tw/p/ai-for-trustai.

Freedom House. 2025. "Taiwan: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report." https://freedomhouse.org/country/taiwan/freedom-world/2025.

Government of the Republic of Korea. 2025. "2025 AI Regulatory Rationalization Roadmap (In Korean)." November 27. https://share.google/PZcVmacmHq5JadpH4.

Gye, Seung-hyeon. 2023. "'Platforms Collect Even Delivery Riders' Speed...Algorithms Remain Undisclosed' (In Korean)." *Yonhap News Agency*. December 12. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20231212084700004.

Heiding, Fred, Alex O'Neill, and Lachlan Price. 2025. "Cybersecurity Strategy Scorecard." Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. March 27. https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/cybersecurity-strategy-scorecard.

Hickiano, Lery. 2025. "Hospital Investigating Leak of 16.6 Million Documents." *Taipei Times*. March 7. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/03/07/2003833024.

Ho, Hui-An. 2022. "TFC's Editor in Chief Shared Taiwan Fact-Checking Experience in CMF's Fact-Check Week Event." *Taiwan FactCheck Center*. April 7. https://en.tfc-taiwan.org.tw/en_tfc_109/.

Hou, James, Jim Huang, Alice Yang, and Louis He. 2026. "Generative AI Under Taiwan Law: Copyright, Fair Use and the AI Fundamental Act." *Chambers and Partners*. February 23. https://chambers.com/articles/generative-ai-under-taiwan-law-copyright-fair-use-and-the-ai-fundamental-act.

Hsieh, Fu-yi and Yi-hui Chien. 2026. "Breaking Free from Traffic Addiction: Taiwan's News Media Survival Battle Against the Generative AI Wave (In Chinese)." *The Reporter*. February 4. https://www.twreporter.org/a/taiwan-news-media-faces-survival-battle-against-generative-ai-wave.

Ichikawa, Tagui. 2020. "Structuring AI Principles for the Future of AI Governance: Co-evolution of Innovation and Institutions in Digital and AI Technologies (In Japanese)." IIR Working Paper WP#20-15. Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University. https://www.iir.hit-u.ac.jp/file/WP20-15_Ichikawa.pdf.

Institute of Geoeconomics (IOG). 2024. "Democratic Nations and Digital Platform Regulation (In Japanese)." *IOG Geoeconomics Briefing*. April 10. https://instituteofgeoeconomics.org/research/2024041057049/.

Intellectual Property Office (TIPO), Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan. 2025. "Email Interpretation 1140522c: Copyright Protection of AI-Generated Images (In Chinese)." May 22. https://www.tipo.gov.tw/tw/copyright/692-34252.html.

IORG (Taiwan Information Environment Research Center). 2022. *A Guide to Information Literacy: Autonomy of Mind — Survival Rules Against Disinformation, Conspiracy Theories, and Narrative Manipulation (In Chinese)*. Taipei: Rive Gauche Publishing House. https://iorg.tw/book.

Jang, Eun-ji. 2025. "AI Safety Institute and Kakao to Develop Real-Time Deepfake Detection Technology (In Korean)." *Donga Ilbo*. May 14. https://www.donga.com/news/Society/article/all/20250514/131603183/1.

Jang, Se-min. 2024. "Seoltab Launches Knowledge Map-Based 'AI Diagnosis'... Leap Toward Personalized Tutoring Service (In Korean)." *AI Times*. January 16. https://www.aitimes.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=156543.

Japan AI Safety Institute (AISI). 2025. *Report on the Specific Influence on AI Safety*. Research contractor: NRI SecureTechnologies, Ltd. October 31. https://aisi.go.jp/assets/pdf/20251031_en.pdf.

Japan AI Safety Institute. 2025a. "Guide to Evaluation Perspectives on AI Safety (Version 1.10)." March 28. https://aisi.go.jp/assets/pdf/ai_safety_eval_v1.10_en.pdf.

Japan AI Safety Institute. 2025b. "Guide to Red Teaming Methodology on AI Safety (Version 1.10)." March 31. https://aisi.go.jp/assets/pdf/E1_ai_safety_RT_v1.10_en.pdf.

Japan Animation Association (AJA) et al. 2025. "Joint Statement on Creation and Rights in the Age of Generative AI (In Japanese)." October 31. https://aja.gr.jp/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/30269151d7cdc6e9bcaeaace2a517c33.pdf.

Japan Association of New Economy (JANE). 2026. "Comments on the Draft 'Principles and Code on Intellectual Property Protection and Transparency for the Appropriate Use of Generative AI' (In Japanese)." January 26. https://jane.or.jp/app/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/principle-code.pdf.

Japan Copyright Office (JCO), Agency for Cultural Affairs, Government of Japan. 2024. "General Understanding on AI and Copyright in Japan" — Overview. May. https://www.bunka.go.jp/english/policy/copyright/pdf/94055801_01.pdf.

Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association (JNPEA). 2023. "Opinion on the Use of News Content by Generative AI." May 17. https://www.pressnet.or.jp/statement/20230517_en.pdf.

Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association (JNPEA). 2024. "Comments on the Draft 'General Understanding on AI and Copyright' (In Japanese)." February 9. https://www.pressnet.or.jp/statement/ai/240209_15315.html.

Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association (JNPEA). 2025. "Statement on the Protection of News Content in Generative AI." June 4. https://www.pressnet.or.jp/statement/pdf/20251113_en.pdf.

Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association. 2026. "Comments on the Draft 'Principles and Code on Intellectual Property Protection and Transparency for the Appropriate Use of Generative AI' (In Japanese)." January 26. https://www.pressnet.or.jp/statement/copyright/260126_16107.html.

Jiji Press. 2026. "80% of Misinformation Mistakenly Recognized as 'Fact': Television Most Common Information Source — Survey by Toyo University on Lower House Election (In Japanese)." February 18. https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2026021700816&g=soc.

Jin, Tae-hee. 2025. "Gyeonggi Office of Education Apologizes over AI Platform Promotional Video Controversy (In Korean)." *EBS News*. November 19. https://home.ebs.co.kr/ebsnews/menu1/newsAllView/60665430/H.

Jo, Jae-ho. 2025. "KISIA Launches Information Security Companies' Autonomous Security Council (In Korean)." *Boan News*. April 16. https://m.boannews.com/html/detail.html?idx=136896.

Ju, Young-jae. 2025. "The Yoon Seok-yeol Government Dismantled the Fact-Check Platform While Claiming to Fight 'Fake News' (In Korean)." *Kyunghyang Shinmun*. October 14. https://www.khan.co.kr/article/202510140600101.

Kakinuma, Shigeshi. 2025. "Introduction of Active Cyber Defense: Overview and Key Issues of the Cyber Response Capability Enhancement Bill and Related Legislation (In Japanese)." *Rippo to Chosa* 474: 3–26. https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/20250414003.pdf.

Kang, A-young. 2024. "The Press Industry's 'Generative AI Code of Conduct'... Scope of Use Specified (In Korean)." *Korea Journalists Association Report*. December 6. https://www.journalist.or.kr/news/article.html?no=57255.

Kang, Mae-hwa. 2026. "Yellow Envelope Act Implementation Imminent...Industry Warns of 'Strike Proliferation Concerns' (In Korean)." *G.ECONOMY*. March 9. https://geconomy.co.kr/mobile/article.html?no=316985.

Kaplan, Joel. 2025. "More Speech and Fewer Mistakes." *Meta Newsroom*. January 7. https://about.fb.com/news/2025/01/meta-more-speech-fewer-mistakes/.

Kawashima, Kae and Naoko Murai. 2025. "Personal Information for AI Learning: No Consent Required for Statistical Purposes — Amendment Bill Reflects Business Community Demands (In Japanese)." *Asahi Shimbun*. December 4. https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASTD43TYNTD4ULFA018M.html.

KBS. 2024. "'80% of Public Sector Hacking Originates from North Korea... Kim Jong-un Personally Directs Operations' (In Korean)." *KBS News*. January 25. https://news.kbs.co.kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=7874659.

Kim, Si-yeon. 2024. "SNU Fact Check Suspended after Seven Years... 'A Setback for Press Freedom in Korea' (In Korean)." *OhmyNews*. August 19. https://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0003055180.

Kim, Young-myung. 2024. "Korea Cybersecurity Research Institute Focuses on Legislative Support for Enactment of the National Cybersecurity Basic Act (In Korean)." *Boan News*. February 20. https://m.boannews.com/html/detail.html?idx=126840.

Korea Communications Commission. 2025. "Korea Communications Commission's First Briefing to the President: Strengthening Response to Disinformation and Online Illegal Activities (In Korean)." *Korea Policy Briefing*. December 12. https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148956403.

Korea Communications Commission. 2026. "Prime Minister Kim Min-seok Convenes Inter-ministerial Meeting on Countering Fake News Including AI Misuse (In Korean)." *Korea Policy Briefing*. February 26. https://www.korea.kr/briefing/pressReleaseView.do?newsId=156746189.

Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA). 2025. "2025 AI Hacking Defense Competition Announcement (In Korean)." September 29. https://www.kisa.or.kr/401/form?postSeq=3546.

Korea Policy Briefing. 2025. "'APEC Gyeongju Declaration' Adopted...First Formal Recognition of Need for Regional Cultural and Creative Industry Cooperation (In Korean)." November 1. https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148953695.

Kyodo News. 2026. "Government Plans Dedicated Disinformation Unit within New National Intelligence Agency (In Japanese)." March 4. https://news.jp/i/1401825509494375358.

Lai, Ching-te. 2025. "Remarks by President Lai Ching-te at the Opening of the Resilient Taiwan for Sustainable Democracy International Forum." Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan). September 20. https://english.president.gov.tw/News/7010.

Lee, Da-hyeon. 2025. "Government Prepares Countermeasures against AI-Generated Fake Advertisements: Introducing 'AI Labeling' and Strengthening Fines (In Korean)." *Yonhap News TV*. December 10. https://www.yonhapnewstv.co.kr/news/AKR20251209122627f3U.

Lee, Ji-hyeon. 2025. "AI Labeling System to Be Introduced to Prevent False and Exaggerated Advertisements for Food and Pharmaceutical Products (In Korean)." *Food Journal foodnews*. December 10. https://foodpe.or.kr/home/m_view.php?ps_db=news&ps_category=&ps_page=4&ps_boid=588&ps_mode=&.

Lee, Sang-hun. 2023. "High-Income Households Spend 5.2 Times More on Private Education Than Low-Income Households (In Korean)." *Economy21*. March 7. http://www.economy21.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=1010996.

Lee, Yu-Hsiao. 2025. "China Index Spotlight: Global Proliferation of Chinese Surveillance Systems: A Case Study of Chinese CCTV Cameras in Thailand." *Doublethink Lab*. August 6. https://medium.com/doublethinklab/global-proliferation-of-chinese-surveillance-systems-f9581ad13de4.

Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China. 2026. "Artificial Intelligence Basic Act (In Chinese)." Presidential Order Hua-Tsung-Yi-Yi No. 11500001671, January 14. https://law.nstc.gov.tw/LawContent.aspx?id=GL000592.

Legislative Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan). 2022. *Copyright Act (In Chinese)*. Amended June 15. https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=J0070017.

Legislative Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan). 2025. *Personal Data Protection Act (In Chinese)*. Amended November 11. https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?Pcode=I0050021.

Li, Cheng-yin and Hsiao-tien Tang. 2025. "Ministry of Digital Affairs to Present Counter-Proposal for Media Bargaining Act by Year-End (In Chinese)." *United Daily News*. June 12. https://udn.com/news/story/6656/8802431.

Li, Wei-Ping and Summer Chen. 2025. "The Looming Threat of the Global Disinformation Battle—A Perspective from Taiwan." *Tech Policy Press*. February 7. https://www.techpolicy.press/the-looming-threat-of-the-global-disinformation-battlea-perspective-from-taiwan.

Li, Wei-Ping, Summer Chen, and Mary Ma. 2025. "More Powerful than Lies: Taiwan's 2025 Recall Campaign and the Rise of AI-Generated Mini Clips." *FactLink*. August 20. https://www.factlink.tw/p/more-powerful-than-lies-taiwans-2025.

Li, Wei-Ping, Summer Chen, and Mary Ma. 2026. "From Misogyny and Historical Enmity to Geopolitical Rivalry: Deconstructing China's Playbook of Narrative Attacks Against Japan." *FactLink*. March 19. https://www.factlink.tw/p/from-misogyny-and-historical-enmity.

Lim, Jae-in. 2023. "Is Naver Falling into AI Omnipotence? Webtoon Copyright Issues Stirring Controversy (In Korean)." *Daily e-News*. August 27. https://www.dailyenews.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=30002.

Lim, Ji-sun. 2023. "As the People Power Party Points to 'Left-leaning' Bias, Naver Suspends Fact-Check Partnership with Seoul National University (In Korean)." *Hankyoreh*. September 25. https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/economy/it/1110031.html.

Lim, Sun-hyun. 2025. "'Providing Article Summaries and Creating Problem Sets via AI Learning Constitutes Copyright Infringement' (In Korean)." *Yonhap News*. December 4. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20251204109600005.

Lin, Cheng-Wei et al. 2024. "FineWeb-zhtw: Scalable Curation of Traditional Chinese Text Data from the Web." arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.16387. https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.16387.

Lin, Chu-yin et al. 2025. "Legislative Yuan Bill No. 202103135970000: Draft Act on News Media and Digital Platform Bargaining (In Chinese)." Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China (Taiwan). https://ppg.ly.gov.tw/ppg/bills/202103135970000/details. (Accessed: April 9, 2026)

Matsui, Kiichi. 2026. "Labor Unions in the AI Era: Denki Rengo Challenges Cross-Company Reskilling — Nordic Countries as the Model (In Japanese)." *Nikkei*. February 12. https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOCD070XF0X00C26A2000000/.

Matsumoto, Takeaki. 2026. "Press Conference Summary by Minister for Digital Transformation Matsumoto (In Japanese)." Digital Agency, Government of Japan. March 6. https://www.digital.go.jp/speech/minister-260306-01.

Ministry of Defense of Japan. N.d. "Response to Information Warfare Including the Cognitive Domain (In Japanese)." https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/infowarfare/index.html.

Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA), Republic of China (Taiwan). 2022. "Does the Ministry of Digital Affairs Ban the General Public from Using Douyin? (In Chinese)." December 27. https://moda.gov.tw/press/clarification/3473.

Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA), Taiwan. 2025a. "Draft of the 'Act for Promoting Innovative Use and Development of Data' Announced: Ministry Advances Data Sharing and AI Development (In Chinese)." July 15. https://moda.gov.tw/press/press-releases/16790.

Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA), Taiwan. 2025b. "Taiwan Sovereign AI Training Corpus Launched: Ministry Collaborates with 200 Government Agencies to Build Domestic Language Resources (In Chinese)." December 24. https://moda.gov.tw/press/press-releases/18314.

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan. 2025. *AI Guidelines for Business: Appendix Ver1.1*. April 4. https://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/mono_info_service/ai_shakai_jisso/pdf/20240419_16.pdf.

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan. N.d. "Cloud Program (In Japanese)." https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/economic_security/cloud/index.html.

Ministry of Education and Statistics Korea (National Data Agency), Republic of Korea. 2025. "2024 Survey Results on Private Education Expenditure for Elementary, Middle, and High School Students (In Korean)." Press release. March 14. https://mods.go.kr/board.es?mid=a10301010000&bid=245&list_no=435485&act=view.

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Japan. 2024. "Guideline for the Use of Generative AI in Primary and Secondary Education (Ver.2.0)." December 26. https://www.mext.go.jp/zyoukatsu/ai/.

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Japan. 2026. "Current Status and Issues Regarding 'Media Literacy' (In Japanese)." Information and Technology Working Group, Curriculum Council. February 13. https://www.mext.go.jp/content/20260213-mxt_kyoiku01-000047326__03.pdf.

Ministry of Education, Republic of Korea. 2023. "Ministry of Education Pushes Forward 'Digital Education Transformation' with Pilot Education Offices for Digital-Based Education Innovation (In Korean)." Press release. May 10. https://www.korea.kr/docViewer/skin/doc.html?fn=df92cb5a8e5dfc97c858a24e1a7b5970.

Ministry of Education, Republic of Korea. 2025a. "Announcement of AI Talent Development Plan for Everyone (In Korean)." Press release. November 10. https://www.moe.go.kr/boardCnts/viewRenew.do?boardID=294&lev=0&statusYN=W&s=moe&m=020402&opType=N&boardSeq=104462.

Ministry of Education, Republic of Korea. 2025b. "Ministry of Education Organizational Restructuring to Advance National Agendas Including AI-Era Future Talent Development, Regional University Support, and Democratic Citizenship Education (In Korean)." Press release. December 23. https://www.moe.go.kr/boardCnts/viewRenew.do?boardID=294&boardSeq=104982.

Ministry of Education, Taiwan. 2025a. *Elementary School Students' Generative AI Learning Application Handbook: Learning Together with AI (In Chinese)*. December. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tb7TTT1z-VAqe1Ae9TCiCMb9q6K8KtM6/view.

Ministry of Education, Taiwan. 2025b. *Middle School Students' Generative AI Literacy Handbook: Mastering AI, Envisioning the Future — Essential Lessons for Digital Citizens (In Chinese)*. December. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mhyKYJllbljZFhZfKgyaGqh5-MyGcO_t/view.

Ministry of Employment and Labor, Republic of Korea. 2026. "Ministry of Employment and Labor Launches Deputy Representative-Level Consultative Body with Labor and Management to Strengthen Policy Communication (In Korean)." Press release. February 9. https://www.korea.kr/briefing/pressReleaseView.do?newsId=156743668.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan. 2025a. "Co-creation Workshop on the OECD AI Policy Toolkit." Press release. August 6. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01520.html.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan. 2026. "Japan-India AI Cooperation Initiative (JAI) (In Japanese)." South and Southwest Asia Division. January. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100963778.pdf.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan. 2025a. "Japan-ASEAN AI Co-Creation Initiative (In Japanese)." October 26. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100927259.pdf.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan. 2025b. "Japan-Central Asia AI Cooperation Partnership (In Japanese)." December. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100957415.pdf.

Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW), Republic of China (Taiwan). 2025. "Executive Yuan Cabinet Meeting Passes Amendment Draft of the Artificial Reproduction Act (In Chinese)." December 11. https://www.mohw.gov.tw/cp-7171-84807-1.html.

Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), Japan. 2025. "Draft of the 12th Basic Plan for Vocational Ability Development (In Japanese)." https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11801000/001660522.pdf.

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan. 2025a. *AI Guidelines for Business Ver1.1*. April 4. https://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/mono_info_service/ai_shakai_jisso/pdf/20240419_14.pdf.

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan. 2025b. *Outline of "AI Guidelines for Business Appendix Ver1.1"*. April 4. https://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/mono_info_service/ai_shakai_jisso/pdf/20240419_17.pdf.

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 2024. "AI Guidelines for Business Appendix (Provisional Translation) (In Japanese)." April 19. https://www.meti.go.jp.

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), Japan. 2020. "Final Report of the Study Group on Platform Services (In Japanese)." February. https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000668595.pdf.

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), Japan. 2023. "Roadmap for Improving Literacy for ICT Utilization (In Japanese)." Study Group on Improving Literacy for ICT Utilization. June. https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000888980.pdf.

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), Japan. 2024. "Report of the Study Group on Ensuring the Soundness of Information Distribution in Digital Spaces (In Japanese)." September. https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000966997.pdf.

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), Japan. 2025a. "ICT Literacy Survey: Data on ICT Literacy (In Japanese)." DIGITAL POSITIVE ACTION. April. https://www.soumu.go.jp/dpa/data/.

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), Japan. 2025b. "Interim Summary of the Working Group on Digital Advertising and the Working Group on Systems Related to Information Distribution in Digital Space." September 17. https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/001030920.pdf.

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), Japan. N.d. "Research and Development Project for Countermeasure Technologies Against Fake and Misleading Information on the Internet (In Japanese)." https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/joho_tsusin/d_syohi/taisakugijutsu.html.

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan. 2026. "Current Status and Trends in Information and Communications (In Japanese)." January. https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/001053461.pdf.

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT), Republic of Korea. 2024. "Intelligent Selective Surveillance System (In Korean)." *Smart City Korea*. December 13. https://smartcity.go.kr/2024/12/13/.

Ministry of Science and ICT. 2025a. "Realizing the Leap to AI G3: National AI Capability Enhancement Strategy (In Korean)." *Korea Policy Briefing*. February 24. https://www.korea.kr/multi/visualNewsView.do?newsId=148939865.

Ministry of Science and ICT. 2025b. "Ministry of Science and ICT Advances 7 Key National Agenda Items! (In Korean)." September 19. https://www.korea.kr/multi/visualNewsView.do?newsId=148953927.

Ministry of Science and ICT. 2025c. "Korea Leaps Forward as the AI Capital of Asia-Pacific (In Korean)." November 3. https://www.korea.kr/multi/visualNewsView.do?newsId=148953754.

Ministry of Science and ICT. 2025d. "Press Release: Amendment to the AI Framework Act Passed by the National Assembly to Drive AI Innovation (In Korean)." December 30. https://www.korea.kr/briefing/pressReleaseView.do?newsId=156737545.

Ministry of Science and ICT. 2026a. "The Indigenous AI Foundation Model Project: From Everyone's Challenge to a Greater Challenge (In Korean)." January 23. https://www.korea.kr/briefing/pressReleaseView.do?newsId=156741091.

Ministry of Science and ICT. 2026b. "Press Release: National AI Strategy Committee Holds Second Plenary Meeting (In Korean)." February 25. https://www.korea.kr/briefing/pressReleaseView.do?newsId=156745851.

Ministry of SMEs and Startups (MSS), Republic of Korea. N.d. "Status of SMEs: All Industries (In Korean)." SME Statistics Portal. https://www.mss.go.kr/site/smba/foffice/ex/statDB/MainSubStat.do?scd=0001.

Ministry of the Interior and Safety. 2025. "Promoting Administrative Innovation through AI: Government Establishes 'Public Sector AI Ethics Principles' (In Korean)." *Korea Policy Briefing*. November 3. https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148953785.

Murphy, Ian. 2024. "TAIDE: Taiwan's Commitment to Innovation, Security, and Global Tech Leadership." *Taiwan Insight*. May 27. https://taiwaninsight.org/2024/05/27/taide-taiwans-commitment-to-innovation-security-and-global-tech-leadership/.

National Academy for Educational Research (NAER), Taiwan. 2018. *Curriculum Guidelines for 12-Year Basic Education: Technology Domain for Junior High Schools and General Senior High Schools (In Chinese)*. September. https://www.naer.edu.tw/upload/1/16/doc/816/.

National AI Strategy Committee (KAIC), Republic of Korea. 2025. "Public Opinion Survey on the Subordinate Legislation and Guidelines (Draft) of the AI Fundamental Act (In Korean)." September 17. https://aikorea.go.kr/web/board/brdDetail.do?menu_cd=000011&num=64.

National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. 2025. *Digital Inclusion Act (In Korean)*. Act No. 20672, enacted January 21, 2025, effective January 22, 2026. https://www.law.go.kr/LSW/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=268533.

National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. 2026. *Framework Act on the Development of Artificial Intelligence and the Establishment of a Foundation of Trust (In Korean)*. Act No. 21311, partially amended January 20, 2026, effective January 22, 2026. https://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsId=014820.

National Assembly Research Service (NARS). 2025. "Press Release: Legal Uncertainty over Copyright in AI Training Data Must Be Resolved (In Korean)." November 14. https://www.nars.go.kr/news/view.do?cmsCode=CM0026&brdSeq=48420.

National Assembly, Republic of Korea. 2025. *Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection (In Korean)*. Amended December 2025. https://www.law.go.kr/LSW/lsLawLinkInfo.do?lsJoLnkSeq=900629576.

National Communications Commission (NCC), Taiwan. 2022. *Draft Act on Digital Intermediary Services (In Chinese)*. Announced June 29. https://www.lawbank.com.tw/news/NewsContent.aspx?NID=185361.00.

National Council for Sustainable Development (NCSD), Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan). N.d. "SDG 16 (In Chinese)." https://ncsd.ndc.gov.tw/Fore/SDG16.

National Development Council (NDC), Taiwan. 2026. "AI New Ten Major Construction Promotion Plan (2025-2028) (In Chinese)." Approved by Executive Yuan, January 28. https://www.ndc.gov.tw/Content_List.aspx?n=EF80A54FA6A63200.

National Development Council. 2021a. *Taiwan Open Government National Action Plan 2021-2024*. Government of the Republic of China (Taiwan). https://ws.ndc.gov.tw/Download.ashx?u=LzAwMS9hZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yLzExL3JlbGZpbGUvMC8xMzY5My84YzRmMWVmNi01NTk0LTQyMTYtYjFkNS04MjE1YzEzY2JmODIucGRm&n=MTI4YTJkNDctZWJkYi00OGZhLTkyODAtMzY5YjQ4NmZiOTM2LnBkZg%3d%3d&icon=.pdf

National Development Council. 2021b. "Balancing Diverse Opinions to Continuously Strengthen the Public Policy Online Participation Platform (In Chinese)." Press Clarification, Information Management Office, February 7. https://www.ndc.gov.tw/nc_10651_34766.

National Development Council. 2025. *Taiwan Open Government National Action Plan 2025-2028*. Government of the Republic of China (Taiwan). https://ws.ndc.gov.tw/Download.ashx?u=LzAwMS9hZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yLzExL3JlbGZpbGUvMC8xMzY5My9jNTZhNGZmMS02ODJmLTQxMDctOTJlOS04N2UwNjE1YjU5Y2IucGRm&n=VGFpd2FuIE9wZW4gR292ZXJubWVudCBOYXRpb25hbCBBY3Rpb24gUGxhbiAyMDI1LTIwMjhf5L%2bu5q2j5YWs5ZGK54mILnBkZg%3d%3d&icon=.pdf

National Development Council. 2026. "Ten AI Initiatives Promotion Plan (2025-2028)." Executive Yuan, Government of the Republic of China (Taiwan). January 28. https://www.ndc.gov.tw/en/Content_List.aspx?n=E738D6D7DD31163F.

National Diet, Japan. 1970. *Copyright Act (In Japanese)*. Act No. 48 of 1970, last amended 2026. https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/345AC0000000048.

National Human Rights Commission of Korea. 2024. "Recommendation to Suspend Introduction and Use of Real-Time Remote Facial Recognition Technology Accepted by Prime Minister (In Korean)." February 22. https://www.humanrights.go.kr/base/board/read?boardManagementNo=24&boardNo=7609889.

National Immigration Agency, Republic of China (Taiwan). 2025. "Influencer Openly Advocates Pro-Unification-by-Force Stance: NIA Strongly Condemns and Will Handle According to Law (In Chinese)." March 11. https://www.immigration.gov.tw/5385/7229/7238/388986/.

National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), Japan. 2022. "Launch of Open Trial for Cybersecurity Exercise Platform CYROP (In Japanese)." Press release. February 3. https://www.nict.go.jp/press/2022/02/03-1.html.

National Security Bureau, Republic of China (Taiwan). 2025. "Analysis on China's Cyber Threats to Taiwan's Critical Infrastructure in 2025." https://www.nsb.gov.tw/en/assets/documents/newsprs/9976f2e1-3a8a-4fa2-9a73-b0c80fca1f04.pdf.

National Security Bureau, Republic of China (Taiwan). 2026. "Analysis of the Chinese Communist Party's Cognitive Warfare Tactics Against Taiwan in 2025 (In Chinese)." January 11. https://www.nsb.gov.tw/zh/.

NHK. 2025. "'Year of Fact-Checking': Verification Expands, but 'Dilemmas' Remain (In Japanese)." September 13. https://news.web.nhk.or.jp/newsweb/na/na-k10014920741000.

Nikkei. 2025a. "Nikkei and Asahi Sue U.S. AI Search Company Perplexity for Copyright Infringement (In Japanese)." August 26. https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUD302I50Q5A730C2000000/.

Nikkei. 2025b. "Japan Faces AI-Driven Employment Inequality (In Japanese)." November 16. https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGKKZO92628740W5A111C2MM8000/.

Nikkei. 2026a. "Companies Confused by 'AI Principles': The Cabinet Office's 'Principles and Code' (In Japanese)." February 16. https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGKKZO94435950W6A210C2BZ0000/.

Nikkei. 2026b. "'Ghibli-Style' Generation Also Prohibited: Sony Group Develops Technology to Protect Copyright (In Japanese)." March 14. https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUC1125A0R10C26A3000000/.

Nippon Animation & Film Culture Association (NAFCA). 2026. "Comments on the Draft 'Principles and Code on Intellectual Property Protection and Transparency for the Appropriate Use of Generative AI' (In Japanese)." January 22. https://nafca.jp/public-comment19/.

Nitta, Takayuki and Masato Tanaka. 2025. "Human Capital Formation in Japan in the Age of AI: Government Edition (In Japanese)." Daiwa Institute of Research. May 30. https://www.dir.co.jp/report/research/economics/japan/20250530_025129.pdf.

Niven, Tim. 2023. "The Evolution of China's Interference in Taiwan." *The Diplomat*. December 1. https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/the-evolution-of-chinas-interference-in-taiwan/.

Office of National Security, Office of the President. 2024. "2024 National Cybersecurity Strategy (In Korean)." February. https://www.president.go.kr.

Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan). N.d. "About the Committee: Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee." https://english.president.gov.tw/Page/670.

Office of the President, Republic of Korea. 2025. "President Lee: 'Realizing a Global AI-Based Society...Active Cooperation with the International Community' (In Korean)." *Korea Policy Briefing*. November 24. https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148955168.

Park, Cheol-eung. 2025. "65% of Large Corporations Utilize AI...Small and Medium Enterprises at Only 35% (In Korean)." *KPI News*. February 14. https://kpinews.kr/newsView/1065593811256351.

Park, Jeong-hyeon. 2026. "'Labor Impact Assessment Before Robot Introduction'...The Debate Sparked by Hyundai's Atlas (In Korean)." *Nodong Beopryul*. February 9. https://www.worklaw.co.kr/main2022/view/view.asp?bi_pidx=38839.

Personal Data Protection Commission Preparatory Office (PDPC), Taiwan. 2025. "Legislative Yuan Passes Third Reading of Draft Amendments to the Personal Data Protection Act (In Chinese)." October 17. https://www.pdpc.gov.tw/News_Content/20/1001/.

Personal Information Protection Commission, Japan. 2026. "Policy for Institutional Reform in the Triennial Review of the Act on the Protection of Personal Information (In Japanese)." January 9. https://www.ppc.go.jp/files/pdf/260202_sankoushiryou-2-2.pdf.

Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC), Republic of Korea. 2025. *Guidelines on Personal Information Processing for the Development and Utilization of Generative AI (In Korean)*. August 22. https://www.privacy.go.kr/front/bbs/bbsView.do?bbsNo=BBSMSTR_000000000049&bbscttNo=20836.

Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election and Recall Act. Amended June 9, 2023. https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=D0020053.

Public Officials Election and Recall Act. Amended January 21, 2026. https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=D0020010.

Pyeon, Seul-gi. 2023. "Naver Uses Webtoon Artists' Drawings for 'AI Training'... Copyright Left in a Legal Gray Area (In Korean)." *Sisaon*. May 23. https://www.sisaon.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=150501.

Regulations for Review of Products Harmful to National Cyber Security. Promulgated December 19, 2025. https://law.moda.gov.tw/LawContent.aspx?id=GL000184.

Republic of Korea. 2025. *Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act*, as amended by Act No. 21045. Promulgated September 9, 2025; enforced March 10, 2026. https://www.law.go.kr/법령/노동조합및노동관계조정법.

Reuters. 2025. "Taiwan Plans AI Projects to Boost Economy by $510 Billion." July 23. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-plans-ai-projects-boost-economy-by-510-billion-2025-07-23/.

Reuters. 2026. "Chinese Cyberattacks on Taiwan Infrastructure Averaged 2.6 Million a Day in 2025, Report Says." January 5. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinese-cyberattacks-taiwan-infrastructure-averaged-26-million-day-2025-report-2026-01-05/.

Sakai, Kohei. 2024. "Fake News Advisory Council Suddenly Dissolved: The Limits of Kasumigaseki Bureaucracy (In Japanese)." *Nikkei*. September 9. https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA28ATM0Y4A820C2000000/.

Seo, Hyo-bin. 2025. "'Making One Good AI Isn't Enough': Industry Calls on the Government for Regulatory Reform and Infrastructure Expansion (In Korean)." *Inews24*. July 9. https://v.daum.net/v/6oSI0ebYcO?f=p.

Seoul Metropolitan Government. 2026. "Seoul-Type AI Ethics Established: Setting Trust Standards for AI Administration (In Korean)." January 6. https://news.seoul.go.kr/gov/archives/574254.

Shan, Shelley. 2025. "News Bargaining Draft Act Discussed." *Taipei Times*. June 13. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/06/13/2003838546.

Shin, So-hyun. 2025. "Recommendations on Cyber Security Laws and Strategies for the Lee Jae-myung Administration (In Korean)." *Asan Issue Brief* No. 2025-27. August 28. https://www.asaninst.org/data/file/s1_1/222742fa858281cd85cc5db0e71d3150_CzSfPEaN_6ab3c845fa87c6399a9a3b435df89766cbfa94bc.pdf.

Shirae, Yasuto. 2025. "An Analysis of Taiwan's AI and Text-and-Data Mining Provisions under Taiwan's Copyright Act (In Japanese)." *Patent* 78, 9. https://jpaa-patent.info/patent/viewPdf/4708.

Small and Medium Enterprise Administration (SMEA), Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan. 2020. "Implementation Guidelines for the Digital Youth Transformation Seed Empowerment Program (In Chinese)." October 21. https://gazette.nat.gov.tw/egFront/eguploadpubWrapper?file=%2FEG_FileManager%2Feguploadpub%2Feg026200%2Fch04%2Ftype2%2Fgov31%2Fnum9%2FEg.htm&metaid=119123.

Smart City Korea. 2022. "Busan City Provides Learning Support and Psychological and Emotional Support for Children from Vulnerable Groups (In Korean)." January 10. https://smartcity.go.kr/2022/01/10/.

Social Order Maintenance Act. Amended June 11, 2025. https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=D0080067.

Stellex Law Firm. 2025. "Cybersecurity Management Act 2025 Amendment: Strengthening Security Governance Regulations (In Japanese)." October 21. https://stellexlaw.com/ja/cybersecurity-management-act-2025-amendment/.

TAIDE. 2024. "Official Release of TAIDE-LX-7B Model: Exploring a More Localized Large Language Model (In Chinese)." April 15. https://taide.tw/public/latest-updates_show?id=4b1141818ecc79f0018ed198c32d1254.

Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in Japan. 2026. "International Forum on Regional Democracy: Minister Lin and Deputy Mayors from Central and Southern Taiwan in Attendance (In Japanese)." January 29. https://www.roc-taiwan.org/jp_ja/post/111260.html.

Taipei Times. 2024. "Taiwan Companies See AI Wiping Out Nearly One-Third of Jobs: Survey." June 27. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2024/06/27/2003819930.

Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD). 2025. "2025 East Asia Democracy Forum." June 18. https://www.tfd.org.tw/en/news/events/2025%20East%20Asia%20Democracy%20Forum.

Taiwan Panorama. 2026. "Taiwan's Own AI Chatbot: Sovereign AI — TAIDE (In Japanese)." February. https://www.taiwan-panorama.com/ja/Articles/Details?Guid=9df92aa7-0bb5-4a25-9d8b-fb3497358ac3&CatId=9.

Taiwan Today. 2026. "NDC Minister Yeh Outlines Plan for 2026." February 5. https://taiwantoday.tw/Economics/Top-News/281331/NDC-Minister-Yeh-outlines-plan-for-2026.

Takabe, Makiko. 2025. "Ideas and Protection: Intellectual Property — Generative AI Infringement... Former Chief Judge of the Intellectual Property High Court, Attorney Makiko Takabe (In Japanese)." *Yomiuri Shimbun*. December 14. https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/20251213-GYT1T00331/.

Tang, Audrey. 2016. "Uber Responds to vTaiwan's Coherent Blended Volition." *Pol.is Blog*. May 23. https://blog.pol.is/uber-responds-to-vtaiwans-coherent-blended-volition-3e9b75102b9b.

Tang, Audrey. 2025. "The Two Choices Left for Humanity (In Japanese)." Interview by TBS CROSS DIG with Bloomberg. YouTube video, 56:38. June 7. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yIepQ8UIHRw.

Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Office of the Governor for Policy Planning. 2025. "Public Consultation for the 2050 Tokyo Strategy Draft: Shin-Tokyo 2050 Project (In Japanese)." January 31. https://www.seisakukikaku.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/basic-plan/choki-plan/ikenbosyu.

Tsai, Chi-chang et al. 2025. "Legislative Yuan Bill No. 11015338: Proposal on Digital Platforms and News Media Bargaining (In Chinese)." Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China (Taiwan). August 6. https://ppg.ly.gov.tw/ppg/download/agenda1/02/pdf/11/03/24/LCEWA01_110324_00006.pdf.

Tsuchiya, Hiroshi. 2025. "Approaching Cyber Defense as a Team: The Focus on Backup Systems (In Japanese)." *Nikkei*. November 25. https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOCD213TF0R21C25A1000000/.

Ueno, Tatsuhiro. 2021. "Data Mining and Copyright: Japan as 'Paradise for Machine Learning' (In Japanese)." *Journal of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence* 36, 6: 745. https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jjsai/36/6/36_745/_pdf/-char/ja.

Ueno, Tatsuhiro. 2024. "'General Understanding' on AI and Copyright in Japan." WIPO. https://www.wipo.int/documents/d/office-japan/docs-en-tatsuhiro-ueno_general-understanding-on-ai-and-copyright-in-japan_set.pdf.

Wakae, Masako. 2025. "Maezawa Yusaku, Victim of Fraudulent Ads, Also Angry: SNS Regulation Continues on a 'Request Basis'." *Asahi Shimbun*. October 1. https://www.asahi.com/articles/AST9Y2Q46T9YUPQJ00JM.html.

Wang, Lisa. 2024. "Foxsemicon Hit by Ransomware." *Taipei Times*. January 17. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2024/01/17/2003812190.

Workforce Development Agency (WDA), Ministry of Labor, Taiwan. 2024a. *2024 Survey on Hiring Conditions in the AI Era: Analysis Report on Labor Market Trends (In Chinese)*. Taiwan Jobs. https://event.taiwanjobs.gov.tw/2024/survey/02/index.html.

Workforce Development Agency (WDA), Ministry of Labor, Taiwan. 2024b. "Learning Innovative AI Applications to Enhance Competitiveness in the AI Era (In Chinese)." Press release. June 26. https://www.wda.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=31&s=16685.

Wu, Shu Kai. 2018. "Legalizing Artificial Insemination and IVF for Single Women (In Chinese)." Public Policy Online Participation Platform (Join). February 12. https://join.gov.tw/idea/detail/53479b9a-8cbb-4ea0-9f16-2294c97f24ac.

Wu, Taijing. 2022. "'What They Need Is a Successful Experience': Taiwan Elderly Learn to Fact-Check on Their Own." *Taiwan FactCheck Center*. March 7. https://en.tfc-taiwan.org.tw/en_tfc_95/.

Ye, Guan-yu. 2026. "Ministry of Labor Drafts AI Guidelines: Expected to Be Released by Mid-Year at the Earliest (In Chinese)." *United Daily News*. March 10. https://udn.com/news/story/7238/9369501.

Yomiuri Shimbun. 2024. "Japan More Susceptible to Misinformation Than US and Korea, Many Do Not Fact-Check... Yomiuri Survey of 3,000 (In Japanese)." March 26. https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/20240325-OYT1T50293/.

Yomiuri Shimbun. 2025a. "Yomiuri Shimbun Sues Generative AI Company for 'Unauthorized Use of Articles'... First Case among Major Japanese News Organizations (In Japanese)." August 7. https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/20250807-OYT1T50151.

Yomiuri Shimbun. 2025b. "Fact-Checking Online Election Information: Four Volunteer Organizations Including Yomiuri Shimbun (In Japanese)." June 4. https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/election/20250604-OYT1T50079/.

Yoo, Seung-mok. 2026. "Korea Newspaper Association: 'Use First, Pay Later' of Copyrighted Works by AI Companies Is Unfair Rights Infringement (In Korean)." *Hankyung*. January 5. https://www.hankyung.com/article/202601052342i.

Yu, Jerry. 2024. "Watch Our Neighbourhood: Collaborative Approaches to Address FIMI during the India Election." *Doublethink Lab*. November 8. https://medium.com/doublethinklab/watch-our-neighbourhood-collaborative-approaches-to-address-fimi-during-the-india-election-727e3e5f0171.

Yu, Jun-ho. 2025. "1 in 20 Wage Workers Is an Ultra-Short-Hour Worker Under 15 Hours a Week...60s Age Group Highest at 69% (In Korean)." *Chosun Ilbo*. December 26. https://www.chosun.com/economy/economy_general/2025/12/26/KMJ3OV4J5FHR7ASHES53X4ZGOQ/.

Yu, Xian-miao. 2026. "Media Industry Hit by AI: Ministry of Digital Affairs Explores AI Assistant Applications and International Content Marketplace Collaboration (In Chinese)." *United Daily News*. March 4. https://udn.com/news/story/7240/9358506.

Zhang, Xiong-feng. 2026. "Ministry of Labor Drafts AI Guidelines for Businesses to Reduce Discrimination and Protect Labor Rights (In Chinese)." *Central News Agency*. March 23. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/ahel/202603230198.aspx.

Zhuge, Jun. 2025. "Media Bargaining Should Include AI (In Chinese)." *China Times*, Shilun Guangchang. July 10. https://www.chinatimes.com/opinion/20250710004241-262104.

Asia Democracy Research Network

Mapping East Asian Initiatives on AI Governance for Democracy

Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) is an independent network of democracy research institutions across Asia.
It analyzes challenges and tasks facing democracy in the region and expands the scope of action-oriented, policy-driven research that supports the advocacy activities of Asian civil society organizations in promoting, consolidating, and deepening democracy.

ADRN Secretariat
East Asia Institute
1 Sajik-ro 7-gil, Jongno-gu, Seoul 03028, Republic of Korea